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DOES PRESIDENTIALISM BREED DICTATORSHIP? – THE CASE OF TURKEY 




This thesis inquires into presidentialism and its compatibility with democracy. Despite its 
poor record of achieving sustainable democracy, it is still considered a democratic form of 
government. Presidentialism is criticized in various ways. Problems arise due to its intrinsic 
institutional design or due to the political environment where presidentialism is applied. This 
thesis discusses presidentialism in both ways. Presidentialism and its intrinsic problems and 
the political environment, the case of Turkey where it is going to be applied. The aim of the 
thesis is to examine the presidential system and its possible effect on governmental system 
in Turkey. Whether Turkey will manage to protect its fragile democratic institutions or fall 
into dictatorship is the main question of this thesis. The thesis also includes the measurement 
of presidential power to give a comprehensive view on the nature of the presidential system 
in Turkey. The examination of the constitutional amendment and the Turkish party system 
reveals that the new system seems likely does not have the necessary institutional tools to 
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Democratic governments differ in terms of their regime types. Most of the established 
western democracies have parliamentary systems. Thus, parliamentarism at first glance 
would seem the preferable choice for the young democracies. However, some countries 
chose presidentialism, and most of them fail to achieve sustainable democracy. In principle, 
presidentialism is not in contradiction with democratic institutions and the practice proves 
that it is possible to achieve sustainable democracy and have a presidential system at the 
same time. However, presidentialism compared to parliamentarism seems like a less 
favourable choice. (Alfred Stepan, Cindy Skach, 1994). This thesis aims to examine whether 
presidentialism is compatible with democratic governance. The case chosen is Turkey. 
Turkey since its establishment had always been a parliamentary republic. However, recently 
in 2017 referendum proposed by the Turkish incumbent party AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) transferred Turkey from parliamentarism to presidentialism. The new 
system grants the president with extraordinary legislative and non-legislative power, which 
raises the question whether the new system will breed dictatorship in Turkey.  
The case is important regarding its uniqueness. Although Turkish democracy is not 
well established one, especially considering that the system was disturbed by coups 
throughout the 20th-century parliamentary regime since the establishment of Turkey 
successfully managed to remain as a democracy. Because each time military left the power 
to a civilian government. However, due to the poor record of presidentialism and the specific 
features of Turkish presidentialism which increases the possibility of democratic breakdown, 
it is not known whether Turkey will remain as a democratic country. The thesis starts with 
the examination of perils of presidentialism which occur due to institutional design of the 
presidential system. The problems which cause democratic breakdown is chosen with respect 
to the given case.  
Dual legitimacy is a common characteristic of all presidential system (Linz, 1990). It 
often causes governmental deadlock which later can result in military interventions or 
presidential self-coup. With respect to Turkey, it is one of the main concerns due to reason 
that Turkey was a parliamentary system for decades. Although the position of parliament in 
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presidentialism is significantly undermined, the historical importance of the parliament in 
the mind of voters allows claiming that parliament despite its weakened role will remain as 
an essential institution. In case there is a conflict between parliament and the executive, 
presidential system does not provide any institutional tool to solve the conflict. Therefore, 
dual legitimacy is taken as one of the possible dangers of presidentialism regarding 
democratic breakdown. Because military or the president may use non-democratic means 
and it can be justified by unsolvable conflict as it happened before in the 1980 coup. 
One of the positive aspects of presidentialism is a rigid separation which increases 
the predictability of the executive and the legislature and ensures the separation of power. 
By Predictability I mean the term is fixed. The executive is free from confidence vote, and 
the president cannot dissolve the parliament. However, the same positive aspect can cause 
governmental deadlock since both branches are independent of one another. In the case of 
Turkey, the rigid separation is examined from a different perspective. The problem of the 
Turkish presidentialism does not arise from rigid separation but the lack of it. Due to the 
extraordinary power is given to the president, it is difficult to ensure the independence of the 
legislature. 
The office of president is indivisible because only one person can be elected. 
Therefore, presidentialism creates a zero-sum game. (Linz, 1994) As a result, a significant 
portion of the voters left unrepresented as their candidate is not elected. Representativeness 
is one of the main principles of democracy. It is also crucial in terms of not leaving people 
of different ethnic and religious background excluded. Turkey is multi-ethnic country 
therefore, it is highly likely that presidentialism will cause further division in a society which 
in long-term dangerous in terms of regime stability.  
Finally, the last peril of presidentialism which may cause trouble in Turkey is the 
personalization of power. Turkish politics since the establishment of the republic was 
dominated by charismatic political leaders starting from the founder of the country M.K. 
Ataturk to Erdogan. This can be explained by the weak institutionalization of parties which 
is discussed in the further chapters of this thesis. Nevertheless, the point here is that how the 
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personalization of power which arises due to institutional design of presidentialism, would 
trigger the personalization of power which already exist in Turkey.  
In order to better understand the situation in Turkish democracy, one chapter is 
dedicated to analysis undemocratic tendencies in Turkey that started in 2002. To do so, I 
used data from V-Dem. Based on five indicators which cover the most important aspects of 
democracy, the current situation is compared to the 2002 situation. The comparison supports 
my claim that since the AKP came to power, Turkish democracy is declining. The empirical 
part is the comparative analysis of the constitution. The amended articles were compared to 
the previous version.   I analyzed the whole amended articles. All of them concern the role 
of president in the system. Other institutions changed according to that. The comparison is 
divided into six sections; Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Judiciary, The office of the 
presidency, Decree Power, State of Emergency, , and Party System in Turkey. These are the 
most critical institutions with respect to their influence on governance. The analysis aims to 
understand how the amendment changed the governmental system. How the president can 
use the presidential power or the gaps that exist in the constitution to evade checks and 
balances. The amendment undermines the role of the legislature in the system. On the one 
hand, it is understandable that in presidentialism the legislature has a comparatively weaker 
position in the system as it is not the source of legitimacy for the executive. On the other 
hand, the key features of the legislature in a presidential system such as initiating budget act, 
overseeing the executive and inquisitioning state officials is limited.  Judiciary as the third 
branch of government has a special role in the system regarding the functionality of checks 
and balances. Despite the form of government, judicial independence is one of the first 
requirements of democracy. The analysis of the amendment reveals that in the new system, 
the balance between the judiciary and the executive is violated in favour of the executive. 
The president is granted authority to, directly and indirectly, appoint all members of the 
Supreme Court. Decree power is another important aspect of the presidential system. A 
separate subchapter is dedicated to the analysis of the decree power because of its unusual 
range in the new system. A presidential decree is not subject to any legislative check, and its 
range is widened which enables the president to rule without the need for a legislature. Since 
the last coup attempt in 2016, Turkey is in a state of emergency. State of emergency allows 
10 
 
the president to take extraordinary measurements and justify it with the emergency. The 
amendment makes it easier for the president to declare a state of emergency without 
legislative consent. Reasons for declaring a state of emergency is also increased. The reason 
for dedicating a separate chapter for the state of emergency is that the president can rule the 
country in a state of emergency if he wishes, therefore, it is important to understand what 
would the country’s situation in case, state of emergency is prolonged for an uncertain period. 
The last part of the analysis is the examination of Party system in Turkey. The level 
of institutionalization, party structures, intra-party democracy, domination of party 
leadership is examined in detail. The aim was to understand how the problems exist in the 
Turkish party system would exacerbate the possible consequences of presidentialism. The 
examination reveals that the governmental system that intended to be established in Turkey 
is very similar to what now exists in Turkish party system. Therefore, it is highly likely that 
current party system with the new presidentialism can damage democracy in Turkey. 
Presidentialism does not perform well in the multiparty system (Mainwaring, 1993). 
However, in the case of Turkey, multiparty system is taken as a necessity in order to prevent 
the domination of the president over the legislature. 
Finally, the last chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the measurement of presidential 
power. The measurement is conducted based on the simple scoring method proposed by 
(Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992) Presidential power is divided into two legislative 
and non-legislative power. The results are compared to the other countries and also classified 
based on Shugart and Carey’s typology. The reason for choosing the given method is its 
capability to cover the most important aspects of presidential power. The measurement 
explicitly shows the uniqueness of Turkish presidentialism in terms of the power given to the 
president. Classification of Turkish presidentialism indicates that Turkey belongs to the 
second region crafted by Shugart and Carey based on the strength of presidential power, 




1. The Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter of my thesis, I will analyze the presidential system from various 
approaches to show the vulnerability of presidential systems which also exist in the newly 
adopted Turkish presidentialism. Thus, I will be able to explain why and how presidential 
system may turn into a dictatorship. My analyze is divided into two parts. In the first part, I 
will focus on internal problems of presidentialism which arise from institutional arrangments 
of the system. In the second part, I will analyze the relation between presidentialism and 
party systems. My aim is to show which party systems and election systems are more suitable 
for presidentialism which are not? In doing so I will be able to show the dangers of the new 
Turkish presidentialism with respect to Turkey’s party system and election system.  
Presidentialism is one of the widely accepted forms of democratic government 
alongside parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and other hybrid systems. Presidentialism 
differs from country to country, however, two main characteristics are present in every 
presidential system. 1. The executive and the legislature are separately elected by the popular 
vote. 2. Ther terms of both are strictly fixed (Linz, 1990). There are other criteria added by 
scholars to define presidentialism. (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992, p. 220) adds two 
more criteria; First, the elected executive names and directs the cabinet. This criterion is also 
added to the definition of presidentialism by (Sartori, 1992, p. 5). Secondly, the president has 
constitutionally granted legislative power. According to the authors, the president without 
legislative power would be the chief of executive only in the literal way. (Sartori, 1992) 
(Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992). Besides aforementioned criteria, Lijphart adds the 
fifth criterion; one-person executive (Lijphart, 1994, p. 3). 
Presidentialism for the first time was applied in the US and since then the US is often 
is brought as an example to prove that presidentialism is compatible with sustainable 
democracy. The US is indeed a valid example, however, considering the poor records of 
presidentialism in terms of its compatibility with sustainable democracy the US can be 
considered as an exception. Already in 1993 in his article, Scott Mainwaring noticed that 
presidential systems do not have successful records. Out of 31 countries which had 
continuous democracy since 1967, only three of them, Costa Rica, the US and Venezuela 
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had a presidential system. Colombia as a sustainable democracy was questioned by 
(Mainwaring, 1993). The Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen constructed a political 
Index of Democratization (ID). ID is based on six variables. (1) The total percentage of the 
vote received by all political parties except the largest vote-getter (2) the total percentage of 
the population that voted. Another socioeconomic index that he constructed called Index of 
Power Resources (IPR). The index is based on six variables. (1) The degree of 
decentralization of nonagricultural economic resources, (2) percentage of total agricultural 
land owned as family farms. Percentage of population (3) in universities, (4) in cities, (5) that 
is literate and (6) that is not employed in agriculture. According to Vanhanen, countries that 
above 6.5 index points which are also threshold, should be considered democracies, countries 
that below minimum level 3.5 index points, should be regarded as non-democracies or semi-
democracies. (Vanhanen, 1990, p. 327). In Vanhanen’s analysis, it is shown that presidential 
had democratic underachievers rate 3.4 times greater than parliamentary system and 
parliamentarism had democratic overachievers 1.8 times more than presidentialism. (Alfred 
Stepan, Cindy Skach, 1994). Linz in his seminal article mostly focused on internal problems 
which he thinks are the results of the institutional design of the presidential system. (Linz, 
1990) Shugart, Carey, Mainwaring rather examined the presidential system with its relation 
to party systems and election systems. (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992). Their 
conclusion was that presidentialism does not perform well in multiparty system and election 
system influence the position of presidents in the system. Two round majoritarian elections 
increase the chance of an outsider to be elected or to become an influential contender in the 
elections.  
In a presidential system, the executive and the legislature are elected by popular vote 
for a fixed term and independent from the vote of confidence. Presidents not only hold the 
executive but they are also the head of the state. (Linz, 1990) and (Elgie, 2005) classifies five 
problems of presidentialism that are present in every presidential system: Dual legitimacy: 
The executive and legislature claim legitimacy which may result in competition rather than 
cooperation, the fixed terms of office make the executive and the legislature rigidly 
separated, presidentialism encourages a winner-takes-all outcome, the style of presidential 
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politics encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition, and presidentialism 
encourages populist candidates. 
1.1.Dual Legitimacy 
The institutional structure of presidentialism generates dual legitimacy. In 
presidentialism, the executive and the legislature are separately and directly elected by the 
popular vote, therefore both bodies are independent of each other. Dual legitimacy does not 
cause problems as long as the presidential office and the national assembly work in harmony. 
Since the president is independently elected, government stability does not depend on 
legislative support. However, the legislature tends to oppose the presidential candidacy or 
nomination if the majority party is different than president’s own, which often results in a 
political crisis. In presidential systems when thr executive lacks majority, the system tends 
to be conflictual rather than collegial. (Jones, 1995). In case of disagreement between the 
presidency and the legislature, neither side is superior nor has the institutional tools to solve 
the crisis. In this case, both claim to be the representative of the will of the people. The 
president may claim that she is the only elected official by the entire people. Thus, the 
conflictual nature of presidentialism encourages presidents to bypass the legislature by using 
decree power. (Valenzuela, 2004).  
Although the president and the legislature are both directly elected by the popular 
vote, the office of the presidency has a special aura. The President is indeed the only official 
post elected by the whole people because the members of the parliament, in most cases, are 
selected by their parties depending on the electoral system. Even in majoritarian elections 
they are not elected by the whole people but only the people from their district. The president 
speaks for her nation, represents her people domestically and in foreign affairs. She acts as 
the face of her nation and most importantly unlike the assembly, the president is a single head 
of the state therefore, can directly address the people and seek legitimacy over the legislature 
more effectively. In case of the success of the president, the democratic balance is broken 
because the president becomes dominant over the parliament. Despite being a hindrance for 
effective government, dual legitimacy can also be seen as preventing factor for the system to 
turn into a dictatorship.  
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1.2.The Rigid Separation 
In a presidential system, the executive and the legislature are rigidly separated and its 
exacerbated by the fixed term. The president is free from the vote of confidence. Moreover, 
the legislature cannot be dissolved by the president. This feature of presidentialism at first 
glance may seem as a strength, as it increases the predictability of the government. (Linz, 
1990) shows that presidentialism is designed to ensure executive stability by the fixed term 
and to increase the predictability of the system. Because in a parliamentary system it is usual 
that before the supposed term of the legislature and the prime minister, the legislature can be 
dissolved or the executive may not survive the vote of confidence. However, presidentialism 
lacks institutional means to resolve the governmental deadlock. Since both are directly 
elected, the only means to depose the president is impeachment. However, impeachment is 
a difficult process to conduct and it applies only in the case of criminal charges against the 
nation. Thus, in presidential systems a possible governmental deadlock is not an unusual 
phenomenon. In many cases, a coup appears to be the only way to depose the unpopular 
president or resolve governmental deadlock. For example, in 1973 in Chile, a coup overthrew 
president Allende because the opposition feared that Allende may try to establish 
authoritarian socialism. (Mainwaring, 1993). Although rigid separation in presidentialism 
appears to be one of the advantages of the system, as it ensures the governmental stability, it 
causes a discontinuity in the political process and decreases the effectiveness of the 
government. To avoid a deadlock, presidents need a majority in the legislature so minority 
governments in presidentialism increases the probability of impasses and breakdowns. 
(Alfred Stepan, Cindy Skach, 1994). Depending on the functions of the legislature and the 
executive, their purpose may vary which in turn results in conflict. However, in 
presidentialism the separation of purpose is greater than in parliamentarism due to an 
independent source of survival. (David Samuels, Kent Eaton, 2002). Supporters of 
presidentialism argue that mutual control between the president and the legislature, prevents 
a majority tyranny or populist government. This option, however, implies low governmental 




The way in which political competition is institutionalized directly and indirectly 
affects the way the incumbent rules the country. Due to the structure of presidentialism, the 
political competition results in a zero-sum game (Linz, 1990). Namely, the elected candidate 
although winning the majority of the votes assumes the executive power alone, leaves the 
rest of the society without representation. The formation of coalitions and sharing the 
executive power with the opposition is possible in presidentialism. (Cheibub et al., 2004) 
shows that unlike in a parliamentary system, the possibility of coalitions to break is higher 
due to two important reasons. Firstly, in presidentialism, the cabinet completely depends on 
the president. Secondly, the executive is not accountable to the legislature. These factors 
make the presidential coalitions less stable. A presidential candidate by gaining the minimum 
required votes is elected as a president, however, the difference between the winner and the 
loser may be a thin line thus, a significant minority is left unrepresented. The same pattern 
can be true in parliamentary systems, however incorporating the opposition to the executive 
is more likely to occur in parliamentarism than in presidentialism.  
The winner-take-all arrangement, which inevitably arises from the institutional 
design of the presidential system, puts the winner in a difficult situation when the incumbent 
does not have support from the legislature which eventually may hinder her to execute the 
presidential power. The presidential system initially designed to create strong executive to 
increase the effectiveness and flexibility of the government, however, in practice it appears 
that due to the zero-sum game it is less effective than it was thought to be because the zero-
sum game exacerbates rigidity of the system. The president and the legislature are elected 
for a fixed term, therefore until the next elections, there are not any institutional means to 
create new alliances and to call new elections as a response to major events. In most 
presidential systems, the presidential elections are consist of two rounds. In the first round, 
all the candidates compete to gain the majority of the votes, if none of the candidates gained 
the majority, the two candidates who gained the most votes qualify to the second round. 
However, if any other candidates gained a significant portion of the votes despite failing to 
qualify for the second round, it would mean that a candidate may have a considerable 
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influence on the elections and the executive government. In a country where the majority of 
the voters concentrated in the centre of the ideological spectrum, this outcome may prove to 
be beneficial in terms of including the other political parties to the executive. However, in a 
country where the extremist far-right parties which have significant support from the public 
may become influential in government formation. Furthermore, in a society where 
ideological and ethnic divisions are present, it may result in further polarization of the society 
1.4.The Style of Presidential Politics and The Personalization of Power 
The presidential office has dual nature. The president is the holder of the executive 
power. In this respect, she has a clear party identity and the same time represents her voters 
at. Moreover, the president is the symbolic head of the state which means she is the president 
of the entire nation and must act as a balancing figure of the political system. The president 
can make conciliatory moves and include her opposition to the executive. However, the 
success of consociationalist policies depends on the personal character of the president and 
the reaction of her opposition. Additionally, the president may provoke her ally and the entire 
plan may backfire. (Linz, 1990).In most presidential systems, the president is free to form 
the cabinet. Therefore, the cabinet is directly under control of the president. In a 
parliamentary system, the relationship between the prime minister and the ministers is 
coordinative in character; however, in presidential systems, this relationship tends to be 
subordinative. Besides, the president can shield her cabinet more effectively than the prime 
minister which may further distance the executive from the legislature. In a system, with 
weak democratic institutions it might create a situation where a president can be able to evade 
checks and balances especially considering presidents in most presidential systems do not 
cut their party affiliations. It increases the chance for presidents whose party has the majority 
in the legislature to take control of both legislature and the executive and indirectly the 
judiciary. Since the president is not only the holder of the executive power but also the 
symbolic head of the state, the personalization of power emerges. It creates the illusion of 
the power and capability of the president among the public, therefore the presidents often 
face high expectations which hinder her to manage the expectations of voters at the same 
time; the same phenomenon may enable the president to influence the public and mobilize 
17 
 
them in achieving her political goals. It may create fear among the opposition and in most 
cases, the opposition is the legislature. In times of disagreement or even contradiction 
between the presidency and the legislature on specific issues, presidents are in an 
advantageous situation. The president may conflate her supporters with the people as if they 
share the same opinion with the whole nation. (Linz, 1990) The president may try to market 
her policies and political standing as the reflection of the people’s will. This, in turn, may 
result in the personalization of the power. The personalization of the power can be seen in 
parliamentary systems where the prime minister enjoys the absolute majority in the 
legislature.  
The nature of presidentialism produces presidents who feel they have a personal 
mandate due to the direct popular elections and presidents who often do not have the majority 
support from the legislature, therefore presidents may attack important political institutions 
to increase their control of the system. In doing so, presidents need legitimacy, most of the 
time presidents find this legitimacy by directly appealing to the public and marginalizing the 
opposition. (Alfred Stepan, Cindy Skach, 1994) This tendency may result in authoritarianism 
in a country. In case the president succeeds to weaken the political institutions. Furthermore, 
Presidents unlike PMs in most cases have decree power, therefore they relatively have more 
liberty. Since presidents do not depend on the legislature for their survival, they can use 
whatever power they have to interfere the legislative process (Gary W. Cox, Scott 
Morgenstern, 2001).  
1.5.Presidentialism and Multipartyism 
The relation between democratic stability and presidentialism also depends on the 
factors which are not intrinsic to the institutional design of presidentialism. One of those 
factors is the party system. To put it more clearly, the fragmentation in the polity directly 
affects the way presidentialism functions. Presidents are always in need of legislative support 
to effectively execute the power which is given by the constitution. In parliamentarian 
systems the executive indirectly formed by the legislature, therefore, the legislature tends to 
support the executive. However, in a presidential system the executive and the legislature are 
independent of each other, thus the legislature less likely support the executive. There are 
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three reasons why the multiparty parliament may not support the executive. First, there is no 
procedure to guarantee that the president has the support of median voter due to the nature 
of presidential elections. Secondly, presidents who have relatively higher legislative power 
can interfere the legislative process which in turn may result in competition between the two 
branches. Thirdly, presidents can form the cabinet without the consent of the legislature. 
These characteristics of presidentialism in the multiparty system may cause inter-institutional 
conflict. (Josep M. Colomer, Gabriel L. Negretto, 2005)  In this regard, for presidentialism 
to effectively function the effective number of parties best to be fewer than three 
(Mainwaring, 1993). Because the fewer numbers of active parties in the legislature decrease 
ideological polarization and increase the chance for the president to form coalitions due to 
reason that the fewer number of parties simplify the process of coalition formation. 
Additionally, the fewer numbers of effective parties increase the chance for the president to 
have a majority in the legislature.  (Mainwaring, 1993). Taking into consideration the 
aforementioned reasons for presidentialism to function well, two-party or dominant party 
systems are more desirable. (Cheibub, 2007, Mainwaring, Shugart, 1997). Because 
multipartyism is more likely to cause deadlock, multipartyism causes ideological 
polarization and, the coalition building in multipartyism is more complicated (Mainwaring, 
1993).  
Another negative effect of multipartyism in presidential systems is an immobile 
executive (Mainwaring, 1993). Presidentialism is institutionalized to ensure checks and 
balances between the executive and the legislature. The reason for such an institutional 
design is to avoid the president to misuse her power and form an autocratic regime. In this 
regard, the legislature can block the president and reject her policy proposals. However, 
multipartyism hinders the president to effectively govern and adequately react to major 
events which may occur anytime. This characteristic of presidentialism is exacerbated by 
multipartyism because if the number of parties is more than three, forming coalitions 
becomes more difficult as each party has different and sometimes conflicting interests. The 
president must seek coalition in every policy proposal. However, coalitions in 
presidentialism are less predictable than in parliamentarism. Although it is evident that 
multipartyism and presidentialism are not desirable in terms of achieving sustainable 
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democracy, the case of Turkey is opposite. Because scholars approach the relation between 
presidentialism and multipartyism in respect to democratic stability and effectiveness of 
government. However, my goal is to analyze the relation between presidentialism and 
dictatorship. With respect to the relation between dictatorship and presidentialism, 
advantages of presidentialism such as two-party and dominant party system are dangerous. 
Shugart and Mainwaring too mention that two-party or dominant party systems are not 
desirable. However, it seems that it is the only way for regime stability in presidential systems 
(Mainwaring, Shugart, 1997). The reason for presidentialism to function well in two-party 
or dominant party systems stems from its tendency toward majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 
1994). Presidentialism entails greater majoritarianism because the executive is concentrated 
not only on one party but one person. Especially, when the legislative and presidential 
elections are concurrent, the likelihood of majoritarian democracy is increased. This 
tendency is heightened by the plurality rule. However, its worth mentioning that in 
presidentialism parties tend to be less disciplined than in parliamentarism therefore, a 
majoritarian democracy which can be emerged in a parliamentary system is stronger than in 
presidentialism. ““In presidentialism, parties can afford to be much laxer with regard to 
internal party unity”” (Lijphart, 1994). 
In conclusion, presidentialism creates a problem for democratic sustainability due to 
its institutional design. Issues such as rigid separation, dual legitimacy,  the personalization 
of power, zero-sum game hinder the system successfully function in various ways. 
Additionally, presidentialism has a poor record in terms of compatibility with a multi-party 
system. However, it should be noted that in this thesis, I approach multipartyism differently. 
Multipartyism despite its negative effect on presidentialism is necessary as a part of checks 
and balances. In the further chapters of the thesis, I will analyse the case of Turkey with 
respect to perils of presidentialism mentioned above. 
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2. Research Method and Design 
In order to understand if presidentialism can breed dictatorship in Turkey, I will 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the constitutional amendment by comparing it to the old 
constitution. I will follow a simple strategy. First, I analyzed the presidential system broadly 
and defined its perils which may cause dictatorship. Later I will apply the perils of 
presidentialism to the Turkish presidentialism in doing so I will conduct a comparative 
analysis of the old and the new version of the constitution and the analysis will be embedded 
in the theoretical framework. The analysis covers The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 
The Office of Presidency, The Decree Power, State of Emergency, Judiciary, Party System, 
Intra-Party Democracy. The analysis is important to show that the amended constitution can 
be problematic not only because of the constitution itself but also due to the weaknesses of 
Presidentialism. The analysis covers the examination of the amendment. The constitution is 
the primary source based on what the institutional design of the governmental system is 
constructed. The amendment sets the role of the president, the assembly and the judiciary. 
Therefore, the analysis will be conducted based on the articles which are amended. Since the 
research question will be examined in the case of Turkey and the Erdogan regime, logically 
the research design will be a single-case study. The case can be compared to other cases 
comparisons will serve only to draw a broader picture of the case. 
Secondly, I will measure the power that is given to the Turkish president by using 
one of the primary methods for measuring presidential power developed by (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992). It divides presidential power into two dimensions legislative and non-
legislative. These dimensions cover ten aspects of presidential power each of which is 
measured based on a scale of 0 to 4 (see Table 1). Legislative power refers to the power that 
is granted to the president by the constitution and is used in the legislative process. Non-
legislative power is the result of separate origin and survival of presidents and assembly and 
it is employed in the executive. Maximum separation is intended ““to ensure that each branch 
could impose checks on the other without fear of jeopardizing its existence,”” and it is 
characteristic of presidentialism (Shugart, Carey, 1992, p. 19). Shugart and Carey’s method 
offers some significant advantages. For example, compared to checklist method proposed by 
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(Frye, 1997). Frye’s method is more extensive he lists ten different specific appointment 
powers. The problem of his method is that it is not clear that if the all powers mentioned in 
checklist method are equally important (Metcalf, 2000, p. 664). However, by using a scale 
of 0 to 4 to measure power in a particular dimension, it is possible for (Shugart and Carey, 
1992) to make clearer distinctions. For example, the Romanian and Polish president are both 
directly elected and they both have veto power. According to checklist method, their veto 
power would be 1. However, to override a veto of the Romanian president, only a simple 
majority is required. And a two-thirds majority is required to override a veto of the polish 
president. Contrary to checklist method, according to Shugart and Carey’s method, the 
Romanian president would receive a score of 0, and the Polish president would receive a 
score of 2. This distinction captures a real difference in the relative powers of the two 
presidents. Another advantage of Shugart and Carey’s method is that it enables to define 
regime type based on the presidential power scores in the non-legislative dimension. More 
precisely on cabinet formation and cabined dismissal. A regime’s score on separate survival 
is based on the censure and dissolution. ““However, it is necessary to reverse the scoring 
order on dissolution to indicate the degree to which the assembly’s survival is separated from 
the president”” (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 159). Although it must be noted that some 
scholars have criticized Shugart and Carey’s categorization of regime types, especially the 
addition of president-parliamentarism as a new type (Linz, 1994, Sartori, 1997). Despite the 
advantages of Shugart and Carey’s method, there are also disadvantages. The main 
disadvantage is that it considers president and the assembly as the only relevant actors, it 
does not entirely capture the dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism (Metcalf, 2000, 
p. 665). For instance, it captures the power of a French president, however, does not take into 
consideration that the president’s ability to exercise power depends on who controls the 
assembly (Metcalf, 2000, p. 665). Nevertheless, this disadvantage cannot be a concern in the 
case of Turkey because the newly adopted system in Turkey is not semi-presidentialism. 
Another pattern of constitutional practice that Shugart and Carey’s method does not capture 
is judicial review. ““Judicial review is an important tool to ensure separation of powers”” 
(Frye, 1997, p. 665).  The review can occur either ““prior to or following the promulgation 
and implementation of a law or executive decree”” (Robert Utter, David Lundsgaard, 1994, 
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p. 224). Granting president power to refer legislation for judicial review would increase his 
legislative power. Therefore, measurement of presidential power alone is not enough to 
understand presidential power. To fill the gap comparative analysis of constitution is 
required. 
Thirdly, I will use V-Dem data to show the authoritarian tendencies since Erdogan 
took power, especially after 2014 as he was elected the president by the popular vote. 
Although, the new system has not been enforced yet, Erdogan has already begun to rule the 
country as in presidentialism. The state of emergency also plays a role in Erdogan’s actions 
as he uses it to justify governing country as if the regime is already presidential. 
V-Dem is an approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. The dataset that is 
provided is multidimensional and disaggregated. It distinguisher seven principles of 
democracy. Electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian and 
consensual. The way in which V-Dem collects data can be divided into two. First data are 
based on factual information obtainable from official documents such as constitutions and 
government records. Second is a subjective assessment based on ratings provide experts. 
Three features of V-Dem data distinguish it from another measure. The first is radical 
disaggregation. 400 detailed questions with response categories or measurement scales are 
used to cover the theoretical principles of democracy. Second, the data is collected from 200 
indicators from country experts, mostly academics. The experts are recruited according to 
their academic or other credentials. The questions are divided into 11 subcategories. 
Typically, a minimum of five independent experts respond to each question for each country 
and year going back to 1900. Thus, more than 2,600 experts from countries across the entire 
globe have responded to the expert surveys. In addition, the V-Dem data are based on a third 
unique feature, namely the use of custom-designed Bayesian ordinal item response theory 
(IRT) modelling techniques to calculate the point estimates for each country-year, taking 
coder characteristics, biases, and cross-coder inter-reliability into account.  
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• The electoral component covers how rulers responsive to citizens through 
competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections Based on 
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which identifies the following political institutions as 
constitutive of modern representative democracy: (1) elected officials; (2) free, fair 
and frequent elections; (3) freedom of expression and alternative sources of 
information; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) inclusive citizenship (universal 
suffrage) The V-Dem Electoral Democracy index measures these features using the 
elected executive index (v2x_accex, based on 12 indicators), the clean elections index 
(v2xel_frefair, based on 8 indicators), the freedom of expression index 
(v2x_freexp_thick, based on 9 indicators, including 3 for alternative sources of 
information), the freedom of association index (v2x_frassoc_thick, based on 6 
indicators), and the suffrage indicator (v2x_suffr). All indices range from 0 to 1 
(Coppedge et al. 2015 p.582) 
• The liberal component of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting 
individual and minority rights against potential ‘tyranny of the majority’ and state 
repression more generally. This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil 
liberties, a strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances that limit the use of 
executive power. In terms of the V-Dem indicators, the liberal component is the mean 
of three BFAs tapping into (1) equality before the law and individual liberty (v2x_rol, 
based on 14 indicators); (2) judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon, based 
on 5 indicators); and (3) legislative constraints on the executive (v2x_legcon, based 
on 4 indicators) (Coppedge et al. 2015 p.583). 
• The participatory component embodies the values of direct rule and active 
participation by citizens in all political processes: it emphasizes non-electoral forms 
of political participation such as through civil society organizations and mechanisms 
of direct democracy. The V-Dem measure is based on the mean value of (1) a BFA 
tapping into the extent of popular participation in civil society organizations 
(v2x_cspart, based on 4 indicators); (2) a derived index tapping the extent to which 
citizens engage in means of direct popular voting, i.e., initiatives, referenda and 
plebiscites (v2xdd_dd, based on 11 indicators); and (3) a derived index of the extent 
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to which there are local and/or regional elections to nonsubordinate executive or 
legislative bodies (v2xel_locelec and v2x_regelec, based on 3 indicators each) 
(Coppedge et al. 2015 p.583). 
 
• The deliberative component enshrines the core value that political decisions in pursuit 
of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all 
levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or 
coercion. The V-Dem measure is a BFA attempting to measure the extent to which 
political elites offer public justifications for their positions on matters of public 
policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect 
counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels 
(v2xdl_delib, based on 5 indicators) (Coppedge et al. 2015 p.583). 
 
• The egalitarian component, finally, encapsulates the ideal of power distributed 
equally among all citizens regardless of class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or other 
social groups. Assuming that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual 
exercise of formal rights and liberties, a more equal distribution of resources, 
education, and health across various groups should also enhance political equality. 
Reflecting this, the V-Dem measure is a BFA based on indicators of both equal power 
distribution and equal resource distribution (v2x_egal, based on 8 indicators) 




3. General Outlines of Political System in Turkey.  
The search for the suitable governmental system in Turkey has been one of the main 
issues since the establishment of the republic. Although Parliamentarism was widely 
accepted form of government, Turkish politicians, political engineers, civil society has 
always discussed the suitability of different governmental systems to Turkey. Therefore, it is 
not a surprise that since its establishment, Turkey adopted three different constitutions (1924, 
1961, 1982). The last 1982 constitution was amended five times in 1995, 2001, 2007, 2010, 
2017. The last amendment is considered the essential one as it changed the governmental 
form from parliamentarism to presidentialism (Eses, 2016). In this part of the thesis. I will 
analyze 1982 constitution including 2007. Amendment to show general outlines of the 
Turkish parliamentarism. The 2010 amendments are predominantly concerned with the 
judiciary, with major changes foreseen in the Constitutional Court and the High Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors (Hakyemez, 2010). Therefore, I will not separately analyze the 2010 
amendment as it does not directly concern the system. I will exclusively focus on the role of 
the judiciary in the 2017 amendment.  The 2017 amendment will be analyzed separately and 
will serve as a comparison of the new and the previous system.  
The main goal of the 1982 constitution was to strengthen the executive against the 
legislature; thus, to ensure the state authority (Demir, 2015). The reason for it was the 
instability of the system. Between 1970-1980 Turkey had changed twelve governments, the 
instability reached its peak in 1980 and resulted in a military coup. Therefore, constitutional 
designers aimed to increase the position of the executive and the president within the 
executive, the authority was given to the president as a symbolic head of the state was also 
increased. “The President is the head of the state, represents the unity of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Turkish nation; Observes the implementation of the Constitution, the regular 
and harmonious work of the State organs" (Art.104, TR Const, 1982).  “From a legal point 
of view, it is possible to say that the 1982 Constitution has moved away from the pure 
parliamentary structure and established "clumsy" or "corrupted" parliamentarism.” 
(Uluşahin, 2011, p. 3). As it is known,  in a parliamentary system the legislature is the only 
institution that has democratic legitimacy, and the power is concentrated in the legislature. 
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The executive receives the power and the legitimacy only from the legislature. The 
presidency is only a symbolic office and does not have any role in the system. The 1982 
constitution gives the presidency significant power and sets it as balancing office. However, 
The reason for the existence of the presidency in the parliamentary system is not to ensure 
the balance and harmony between branches, but not disrupt it. (Uluşahin, 2011). The 1982 
constitution equipped the president with an important authority, who became a figure 
competing with the government. Unlike in other parliamentary systems where the election 
of the president is an unimportant issue and happens rather silent, in Turkey election to the 
office is a vital issue and causes longlasting debates and political crisis. 
Although the 1982 constitutions increase the authority of the president, parliament 
remains the only popularly elected institution, therefore, dual legitimacy does not occur. 
However, the 2007 amendment changed this rule.  As a result of the referendum held on 21 
October 2007, the election procedure of the President of the Republic was adopted; (art.101) 
The fact that the president is elected by the popular vote, dual legitimacy occurs in the system. 
Legitimacy one of the most important requiremeny of contemporary democracy along side 
accountability. In representative democracies, the president needs legitimacy to utilize their 
authority. The office that is popularly elected provides that legitimacy. In parliamentary 
systems, the legislature is the only popularly elected institution, therefore, the other public 
offices receive legitimacy from the legislature. However, the 2007 amendment created a 
situation where the president does not need support from parliament to utilize her power. The 
fact that president is elected and naturally represents a political party, the neutrality of the 
office is abolished. Furthermore, if the president’s party has the majority in the legislature, 
the possibility that the president alone dominates the legislature and the executive is 
increased. Abolishment of neutrality of the presidential office is more dangerous in a system 
where political strongman is present such as what has been happening in Turkey. The 1982 
constitution grand the presidency with the power which is unusual for parliamentary systems. 
“Appointing the prime minister and accepting his resignation (art.109); Deciding on the 
renewal of the Parliamentary elections (art.116); To submit constitutional amendments 
(art.175); to apply for annulment action directly to the Constitutional Court in substance, of 
laws, of presidential decrees, of Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of 
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Turkey or of certain articles or provisions (art. 150); To elect members of the Constitutional 
Court (art.146) In addition, the Constitution also gave some important powers such as 
election and appointment of some high judges , president and members of State Supervisory 
Board, members of Higher Education Council and rectors (art.104). Furthermore, the 
president is publicly elected after the 2007 amendment and it significantly increases the role 
of the president in the system. However, despite the unusual power of the president, Turkey 
can still be considered parliamentary republic. The power given to the Turkish president 
comparing to other semi-presidential systems such as France is still lower. For example, 
unlike the French president, the Turkish president presides over the cabinet only in 
exceptional situations (art.104). Then, according to the French Constitution, the President is 
entitled to take the measures alone required by the state of emergency (art.16 FR Const, 
1958); According to the Turkish Constitution, this power is shared between the President and 
the Council of Ministers (Art.104). As such, it would not be wrong to say that the Turkish 
government continued to maintain the basic features of the parliamentary regime under the 
1982 Constitution. First and foremost, the 1982 Constitution continues to preserve the 
principle of "the government's responsibility towards the parliament", the most important and 
defining element of the parliamentary regime. As in the 1961 constitution, in the 1982 
constitution requires the government to receive confidence vote before starting the duty. 
(art.110, 111) 
Finally, the 1982 constitution by given the president the right to call for early 
elections, protects one of the important principles of parliamentarism. First of all, the 
constitution does not allow the president to dissolve the parliament. President can only the 
renew the parliamentary elections if (1) the government fails to gain the vote of confidence, 
therefore, falls, (2) parliament fails to form a government within 45 days, (3) Prime minister 
resigns the office. Furthermore, it is important to note that, until the new parliament is elected 
the former parliament remains in power. Thus, it ensures that the state never left without the 
legislature. These powers are given to the president as the head of the state rather than as the 
head of the executive. Therefore, it is possible to confidently claim that, despite the unusual 




3.1.Comparative Analysis of Turkish Presidentialism 
 
The presidential system is not a new phenomenon in Turkish political history. Former 
presidents Suleiman Demirel and Turgut Ozal had brought this topic on the Turkish political 
agenda. However, the transformation to the presidential system did not go further from only 
being a topic of political discussion due to the lack of appropriate political conditions and 
unwillingness of the political actors. Recently, the same topic had been brought on the agenda 
by the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan and his party officially proposed 
an amendment to the assembly. The main oppositional parties strictly criticised the proposal. 
The main concern of the opposition was that in case the proposal passes the legislature and 
admitted as a result of a referendum, judiciary will not be independent, the executive will not 
be subject to supervision, the president will also be a party leader, therefore he will be able 
to determine candidates for parliament and will have absolute power on legislature and 
legislature will not be able to interfere state activities, as a result, Turkey will turn into 
dictatorship (Köylü, 2016). The main reason according to the Turkish incumbent party to 
transform the system to presidentialism was to achieve political stability and enforce the state 
authority which was discussed already after the second term of Erdogan as a prime minister 
(Türk, 2011). However, the competence of presidentialism with democracy additionally, the 
unusual nature of the constitutional amendment which grants president with extraordinary 
power raised questions whether the new system may breed dictatorship in Turkey. In this 
part of my thesis, I will compare the new Turkish presidentialism to the former system to 
show the irregularities and the dangers which may cause democratic breakdown and enable 
the president to evade checks and balances. The comparison is important in understanding 
the radical shift in the system. I will separately analyze, Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 
Judiciary, The office of the presidency, State of Emergency, and Party System in Turkey. 
These are the most important institutions which ensure the continuity of democracy. As result 
of the comparison, I am planning to show how the balance between branches of power is 
violated in favour of the executive which I believe is the main danger for the system to 
become a dictatorship.  
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3.1.1. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
Considering that in the constitutional amendment legislative authority of the Turkish 
parliament is shared with the executive via presidential decrees, the authority to scrutinize 
the executive by legislature is removed and therefore the position of the parliament in the 
political system is weakened. It raises question how increasing number of deputies from 550 
to 600 in the parliament will serve to Turkish democracy? Especially since the 10% percent 
threshold is still enforced, the legitimacy that parliament claims to be the only balanced and 
just representation of the Turkish people is not possible. (Art 75). According to the 
Amendment, elections for the assembly will be held every five years at the same time with 
presidential elections (Art. 77). The main characteristics of a presidential system are the 
separation of power.  The legislature and the executive are designed to check and control 
each other. Separate elections of two different branches is an important tool to prevent the 
integration of the legislature to the executive. Therefore, while keeping the presidential 
elections day fixed, the parliamentary elections day can change or it is held in the different 
day. (Eses, 2016, p. 2). Because it is not hard to imagine that, if the elections for two branches 
are held at the same day where the same political climate prevails, the president and the 
majority in the legislature will be from the same party or coalition. Thus, the president 
indirectly will have the control of the legislature. However, the results may be opposite. For 
example, In Guatemala, where Parliament and presidential elections were held on the same 
day, Jorge Serrano Elias won the presidential election of 68% in 1990, while his party won 
only 15.5% in the parliamentary elections. In 1997, Abdala Bukaram in Ecuador was elected 
president in the second round, while his party had only 15 seats in parliament out of 82. Maria 
Vargas Llosa received 32% and Alberto Fujimori received 29% in the 1990 Peru presidential 
elections. Fujimori was elected president with 62.5% of the votes in the second round. But 
the party won only 32 of 180 MPs in Parliament (Eses, 2016). In cases where such outcomes 
occur, it is always probable that various political crises will arise between the President 
directly elected by the people and the majority of the legislature of different political views. 
(Feyzioglu, 2017). This is where one of the perils of presidentialism Dual legitimacy 
negatively affect the system to function. When the parliamentary majority is different from 
the president’s party, the chance of governmental deadlock is increased. Since the executive 
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and the legislature are separately elected, both have electoral legitimacy. Additionally, 
presidentialism lacks an institutional tool to solve disputes between the president and the 
legislature due to the rigid separation. Therefore, it is possible to claim that governmental 
deadlock may destabilize the system and cause democratic breakdown  The two-round 
presidential election method can also negatively affect the relationship and cooperation 
between the legislature and the executive. Because in the two-round election, the voter in the 
first-round votes to the one she wants to see as the president, while in the second round, the 
orientation of voter is determined not by the candidate that she prefers but mostly by the 
candidate that she does not prefer. Thus, the Parliament and the presidential elections on the 
same date and the two-round election of the presidential election are likely to create a weaker 
president.  
Another change in the constitution concerns the number of deputies in the assembly. 
The number of deputies is increased from 550 to 600 to provide a better representation of 
voter (Art.75) One of the criticized features of the electoral system in Turkey is the 10% 
threshold. As long as the threshold remains, claiming that the by increasing the number of 
MPs to achieve better representation of people does not seem possible. The number of 
lawmakers in countries with more populous than Turkey is around 500. For example, in the 
US with a population of 325 million, the House of Representatives consists of 435 
congressmen, In Mexico with a population of 112 million, the Congress of Deputies consists 
of 500 people, In Brazil with a population of 201 million, 513, In the Russian Federation, 
which has a population of 145 million, Duma consists of 450 deputies. ““Therefore, this 
change seems to be an arbitrary preference of the constitutional designers, rather than a 
requirement to reflect the fair representation to the assembly”” (Eses, 2016). During the pre-
referendum campaign, the incumbent party often stressed on the amendment which decreases 
the age of eligibility to be elected as a deputy from 25 to 18 (Art 76). This amendment was 
used to claim that participation of Turkish youth in politics will increase. However, it is hard 
to believe that a person, age of 18 can have high education, ability, and experience to serve 
as a deputy. In most countries, age limit to be elected a deputy is 25. Especially, considering 
that according to the Turkish party law, party leaders are allowed to choose any party 
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members, they want to send to parliament as a deputy. Indirectly, party leaders appoint 
deputies. Thus, it will negatively affect efficiency and legitimacy of the Turkish parliament. 
The 6th article of amendment proposal to the article 77 of constitution removes the 
authority of parliament to inspect the ministerial council and the ministers (Art.77) This 
amendment deprive the legislature of constitutional means to have a political control on the 
executive. This amendment goes beyond the presidential system where the separation of 
power is considered the essential characteristic of the system. In this context, it is clear that 
the president can appoint ministers without the consent of the assembly. Presidentialism, as 
I discussed in the theoretical part, creates the personalization of power. Especially, presidents 
with extraordinary power exaggerate the phenomenon. The president who is not subject to 
legislative oversee would look stronger than she is. Such an outcome would serve 
disintegration of two branches. The proposal substantially changes the powers of the 
Parliament to oversee the executive organ. The amendment removes the 99th and 100th 
articles that regulate the methods of confidence vote and a parliamentary inquiry. In the 
Artice 98 of the previous Constitution, MPs have the authority to ask questions to the prime 
minister and ministers, both verbally and in writing. The amendment removes the verbal 
question. According to the amendment, written questions directed to the president's deputies 
and ministers must be answered within fifteen days. The written question is one of the least 
effective means of monitoring the executive. Moreover, the proposal does not bring any 
regulation on what will happen if the questions are not answered within fifteen days, making 
it completely ineffective in practice. (Eses, 2016, p. 6). It is important to note that MPs cannot 
ask a question to the president in any form. This amendment creates an untouchable position 
which cannot be questioned however assumes all the executive and significant legislative 
power. Such a position is unusual for democratic systems and resembles absolute 
monarchies. 
According to the amendment the assembly can override the presidential veto only if 
the absolute majority is achieved. (Art.89) This amendment requires the legislature to 
achieve “qualified majority” to insist on their vision. The presidential vote is equalized with 
an absolute majority of the legislature. However, before the amendment, a simple majority 
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was enough to override a presidential veto. This change must be evaluated together with the 
other provisions of the constitutional amendment. As a result of such an assessment, it can 
easily be seen that in addition to the extraordinary executive powers concentrated in the 
presidency, there is also a great imbalance in favour of the President on the legislative power 
within the system. Indeed, on the one hand, the president assumes the parallel legislative 
authority through the extraordinarily empowered presidential decree which I will discuss 
more in the following chapters. On the other hand, by using the veto power can influence 
and interfere already weekend legislature. Considering reasons mentioned above, in case the 
president has the majority in the legislature, it is possible to claim that the separation of power 
is violated and the president controls both the executive and the legislature.  
3.1.2. The Office of the Presidency 
The amendment sets the president as the head of the state and the executive. The 
President exercises the power according to the Constitution and the laws (art.104/1) The 
"executive authority belongs to the President" points to the monocephalous nature of the 
governance. The amendment does not change the conditions for electing a president 
(art.101). According to this, the president will be elected among the Turkish citizens who 
have completed their forty years of age, have completed higher education and have the right 
to be elected as deputies. On the other hand, the condition which requires a presidential 
candidate to be an age of 40 is open to criticism. In presidential systems where the executive 
authority is the sole one, the age requirement is not as higher as in Turkey. ““It can be argued 
that the conditions for the election of a president are a sign of a selective, discriminative 
political understanding. Moreover, the conditions imposed contradict the regulatory 
approach to reducing the single deputy's age to 18.”” (Eses, 2016, p. 8).  
If the elections cannot be completed, the current president will continue to serve until 
the new president is elected. The amendment mentions that in case the president is elected 
among deputies, the membership of the president to the assembly would end. However, the 
amendment does not mention anything regarding the neutrality of the president. In this case, 
it is possible to assume that the president may continue to be a member or even a leader of a 
political party. The arrangement that allows the president to be a member, or even a leader, 
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of a party at the same time creates the danger of integrating the state and a party into the 
personality of the president. For this reason, there is a fair criticism that the regulation will 
lead to a "party state." According to the amendment, one person can be elected as a president 
at most twice (art.101).  The limitation of the term to elected persons is a standart application 
in the democratic countries. However, when the article 116 is evaluated, it appears that the 
possibility of exceeding the term limit which prescribed in the article 101. Thus, according 
to article 116, the elections for parliament and presidency shall be held together, however, if 
the assembly dissolve itself and call for the early elections, the president in his second term 
can be a candidate for the third time. Therefore, in a composition where the majority of the 
parliament has the same political orientation with the president, the assembly by renewing 
its elections, can enable the president to rule for the third time. In such case, it is clear that 
one can inactivate the regulation that a person can be elected "up to twice." 
The constitutional amendment gives broad authority to the president. Part of these 
authorities exists in the 1982 constitution. The president is the head of the state, represent the 
unity of the Turkish nation, ensures application of constitution, harmonious and regular 
operation of state organs. If deemed necessary, the first day of the legislative year in the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey makes opening remarks, publishes the laws, has a veto 
power etc. (art.104). On the other hand, the amendment also gives the president new powers. 
Accordingly, the President gives the message about the internal and external politics of the 
country, determines national security policies and takes necessary measures, issues a 
presidential decree, appoints and cease vice-presidents and ministers, appoints and ceases the 
upper echelon of the public administration, may issue regulations to provide the enforcement 
of the laws. In addition to Article 104, other articles also give the president authorities. For 
example, the president decides on conditions to renew the assembly elections (art.106).  The 
president can call the assembly to hold a meeting during a pause or holiday (art.93). The 
president may declare a state of emergency and may issue a state of emergency decree 
(art.119). She appoints the member of Judge and Prosecutor Board and the Constitutional 
Court (art.159, art.146). Present the budget and final account law proposals to the Assembly 
(art.161). She appoints the president and members of the State Supervisory Board. (art.108). 
She is responsible for ensuring national security and appoints the Chief of General Staff 
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(art.117). Presides over the National Security Council, organizes the agenda of the board, 
evaluate the decisions taken by the Board (art.118) etc. It can be said that the amendment 
gives the president broad authority which can be even further expanded through laws. (Eses, 
2016)  It creates a situation where the president is overpowered against the legislature and 
judiciary in which the separation of power is weakened.  
As an example of key authorities granted to the president: the president can regulate 
the executive branch almost indefinitely and uncontrolled. According to the amendment, the 
president appoints and cease vice presidents and ministers (art.104, 106). However, these 
appointments are not subject to the supervision or approval of parliamentary or any other 
body. However, in a presidential system, the appointments made by the president for senior 
executives are supervised by the parliament. According to amendment, the vice presidents 
and ministers are accountable to the president. The amendment violates the separation of 
power and undermines the parliament's power to oversee executive’s actions. The US 
presidentialism was taken as an example for the Turkish presidentialism and the stability that 
the US presidentialism provides to the system was one of the arguments that were used to 
support the constitutional change. However, the US constitution adopts the Madisonian 
variant which separation of power is designed as follows: dispersion of government into three 
branches by allocating the functions of government equivalently. (Gersen, 2010, p. 302). The 
amendment does not follow the principles of the US presidentialism. For example, according 
to the Constitution of Bolivia, the president is respectful of the multinational structure and 
gender equality of the country in determining its cabinet (Article 158). Apart from age and 
citizenship, the Constitution also introduces other criteria such as not being partners or 
owners of financial institutions and companies that have a contractual relationship with the 
state. Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica have 
similar arrangements. In Bolivia, Argentina, and Peru, the president is not authorized to 
dismiss ministers. In short, in presidential systems appointment power is not unrestricted 
(Araujo, Silva, and Vieira, 2016 cited in Eses 2010). The president with unlimited 
appointment power does not exist in any democratic presidential systems. 
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In accordance with the amendment, to open investigation for allegedly committing a 
crime for the President requires absolute majority two-thirds of the total number of member. 
This method will continue to be implemented in the same way for the crimes allegedly 
committed during that period, after the termination of the term of office of the President. 
(art.105) The arrangement and the procedures of impeachment make almost impossible to 
depose the president for the crimes she might do during the presidency. The amendment to 
open an inquiry in the Assembly requires a large majority of the total members. However, to 
have an approval for inquiry is not enough to start an investigation. To start an investigation 
requires five-thirds of the total numbers of members. Then if the consent is gained to open 
an investigation another two-thirds majority is required to pass the investigation to Supreme 
Court. Moreover, the same procedure will be applied even after the president leaves the 
office. In short, it can be said that this regulation provides the president with a shield and the 
assembly to use its power to supervise the president becomes almost impossible. The 
amendment makes impeachment almost inpossible which is another form of check and 
balance 
As a result, the role of the president in the new system is significantly increased. The 
power is given to the president is similar to absolute monarchies rather than democracies. It 
is hard to believe that a system with such a strong president would remain a democracy. 
3.1.3. The Decree Power 
One of the important authorities that the amendment has granted to the president is 
the authority to issue decrees.  The presidential decree includes regulation of the following 
state matters: To establish or disestablish ministries. Duties, authorities and organizational 
structure of ministries. (art.106); The functioning of the State Supervisory Board, the term of 
office of its members and other institutional matters (art.108); The organization and duties 
of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (art.118); The procedures and 
principles regarding the appointment of senior executives (art.104).  The decree power 
granted to the president through the amendment is much broader than the decree power was 
given to ministerial cabinet in a parliamentary system. Additionally, the amendment provides 
the decree power directly to the president, however, in the parliamentary system the decree 
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power was not given to prime minister but the cabinet. Therefore, it is possible to claim that 
such an arrangement will result in the personalization of power. The decree power in the 
Turkish parliamentarism is limited and subject to the approval of the assembly. However, the 
amendments leave no means to the assembly to have a control over presidential decrees. If 
the majority in the assembly does not support the president, and if the president does not 
want to cooperate with the political opposition, in order to overcome parliament's opposition, 
the president may try to govern the country by only using the decree power. In cases where 
the majority of the assembly support the president, the president would have a dictatorial 
power because he will not face any restrictions. ““Guillermo O’Donnell. (1998: 110) coined 
the term "horizontal accountability" to focus attention on the network of "state agencies that 
are authorized and willing to oversee, control, redress, and if need be sanction unlawful 
actions by other state agencies””. (Cameron, 2003, p. 102). The concept is closely linked to 
the separation of powers, an essential feature of the constitutional state that underpins liberal 
democracy.” Considering the broad authority is given to the president via presidential 
decrees, it is hard to believe that other state agencies and branches of government will be 
able to perform “horizontal accountability.” 
Another important authority granted to the President is related to the budget and final 
account laws. One of the most striking aspects of the amendment is that the authority to 
present the budget law proposal to the Assembly is given to the president. (art.161) This 
authority granted to the president violates the principle of separation of power. For example, 
in the US the president cannot offer a budget proposal. The proposal must be presented by a 
Congressional member. And the president cannot change the amount of budget by issuing a 
presidential decree. MPs of the Grand National Assembly cannot make a proposal for 
reducing or increasing the expenses. Parliaments control on a budget is one of the main 
mechanisms in which the legislature controls the executive. In the US Congress effectively 
use this power against the president thus ensures the separation of power. (Kagan, 2001). 
One of the criticisms of this amendment is that a provisional budget law should be enacted 
if the new budget law is not passed.  If the provisional budget law cannot be enacted then the 
president has a right to use the budget of the previous year. With this arrangement, the 
president will be able to spend without the approval from the legislature. Admission and 
37 
 
supervision of budget are one of the oldest and most important authorities of all parliaments. 
The proposal invalidates one of the most important control powers of the Assembly.  
The decree power and the budgetary initiative is another means in which the president 
is significantly empowered against the legislature. The decree power that the new system 
grants the president violates important principle of presidential democracies - separation of 
power. Additionally, exacerbate the personalization of power. 
3.1.4. State of Emergency 
At first look, the examination of the state of emergency may look irrelevant. 
However, considering that since the last coup attempt, state of emergency still continues in 
Turkey and maybe one of the most important referendums in Turkish political history was 
held while the state of emergency was enforced. It is important to analyse how the system 
would work in the presidential system in case the state of emergency continues and how the 
role of the president would even be more powerful during the state of emergency 
The amendment increases the reasons for declaring the state of emergency. The 
reasons are war, conditions which may lead to a war, mobilization, insurrection, natural 
disaster, epidemic disease and severe economic depression. (art. 122). However, the point 
here is not the reasons for declaring an emergency but the authority given to the president 
during the state of emergency. Considering that the since the last coup attempt 15 July 2016, 
state of emergency is continuing and even the constitutional referendum was held under such 
circumstances and there is no sign when the government will end state of emergency, 
therefore it is possible that the president by simply extending state of emergency can rule the 
country with dictatorial power. According to the amendment, state of emergency will be 
declared with a decision taken by the president. The amendment removes the requirement to 
get the consent of National Security Council. the president does not have to consult even his 
own ministers before declaring a state of emergency. The president can declare a state of 
emergency in the whole or in some part of the country. The duration should not extend six 
months. State of emergency can only be enforcef after the consent of the assembly. The 
parliament can shorten and extend the duration or remove it at all.  With the request of the 
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President, the Parliament may extend the period not to exceed four months each time. This 
four-month period is not sought during the war. The amendment does not set the limit on 
how many times state of emergency can be extended. This arrangement enables the president 
who has the majority in the legislature to rule the country under a state of emergency during 
the whole period of presidency. The amendment gives the president the authority to issue a 
presidential decree regarding issues which related to the state of emergency. According to 
the amendment presidential decrees issued during a state of emergency should be presented 
to Assembly for approval. Moreover, decrees which are issued during a state of emergency 
are not bound by the limitations imposed on decrees during the ordinary periods in article 
104. According to the amendment, decrees issued during a state of emergency cannot be 
brought to the Constitutional court for being against the constitution. The amendment gives 
the president broad and uncontrollable authority that is not even seen in non-democratic 
regimes. As a result, during state of emergency judicial and legislative power will be under 
control of the president. The limits for the president to use this power is weak. 
 
3.1.5. Judiciary 
Judiciary as a separate branch is designed to limit the power of other branches. In 
order to function well, the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. Hayek classifies 
two ways in which judiciary can limit the power. First, the creation of laws and the 
administration of justice can be separated. Legislatures make laws, but independent judges 
enforce them, without interference from the legislature or the executive. Second, lawmaking 
and policy-making can themselves be subject to review by courts for their compliance with 
the constitution. (La Porta et al, 2004, p.446). Judiciary’s role is also described in a similar 
manner by Kagan. Judiciary can play a role in controlling administrative government in 
either of two ways: directly, by engaging in a substantive review of agency decisions, or 
indirectly, by supporting, through various rules of procedure and process, other institutions 
and groups that can influence agency policymaking. (Kagan, 2001, p. 2269). In principle, 
judicial independence promotes both economic and political freedom, the former by resisting 
the state’s attempts to take property, the latter by resisting its attempts to suppress dissent. 
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(Judicial Checks and Balances, 2004, p. 447). Besides seeking to influence judges, the 
executive and the legislature would also wish to pursue policies and pass laws that benefit 
themselves, democratic majorities, or allied interest groups. Constitutional review is intended 
to limit these powers. By checking laws against a rigid constitution, a court—particularly a 
supreme or a constitutional court—can limit such self-serving efforts. (Judicial Checks and 
Balances, 2004, p. 447). However, the constitutional amendment violates the basic principles 
of judicial independence mentioned above. 
Article 1 of the amendment to article 9 of the constitution states that the judiciary 
authority shall be used by "independent and impartial courts" However, it is clear that judicial 
independence and judicial impartiality cannot be achieved only by writing it in the 
constitution. What is important at this point is that some provisions which are contrary to the 
judicial independence and have a detrimental effect on the impartiality of the judiciary are 
included in the constitution. The presence of certain provisions which increase the influence 
of the executive over the judiciary and which severely impair judicial independence and 
impartiality makes it hard to believe that judicial independence and impartiality will exist in 
the new system. The composition of the "Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors" in 
Article 159 of the Constitution is amended. It should be noted that this proposal 
fundamentally contradicts the notion of independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The 
amendment gives the authority to the president to directly appoint five members of 13 
membered board. Considering that The president also appoints the Minister of Justice and 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Justice who are also members of the board, the number 
becomes 7. Moreover, it should be noted that the president who makes these appointments 
is also the head of the ruling party in the legislature. The remaining five members of the 
board according to the amendment is to be appointed by the assembly. Therefore, if the 
president has the majority support in the legislature, it is not difficult to predict that the 
president will undoubtedly have last say on appointing the other remaining members of the 
board. Thus the president with party identity will have the power to shape the judiciary as he 
desires. The amendment to the Article 146 reduces the number of members of the 
Constitutional Court from 17 to 15. As a result of the removal of the military courts following 
the amended regulation, the application of the Military Court of Cassation and the Supreme 
40 
 
Military Administrative Court to elect a member of the Constitutional Court is terminated. 
The important point here is not the reducing number of members but the way those members 
are appointed. 
- The three members are elected by the Parliament, which the President controls as the 
chairman of the ruling party. 
- The three members are proposed by the YÖK (Council of Higher Education) whose 
members are determined by the President and elected by the President. 
- The four members are selected directly from the President. 
- The remaining five members are also chosed by the President from the candidates 
nominated by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. 
In sum, almost all Members of the Constitutional Court are elected and appointed by 
the President in some way. It is inevitable that a Constitutional Court formed in such way 
will become dependent on the executive.  
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3.2. Party System in Turkey 
This chapter discusses the Turkish party system, its characterishtics and fetures. The 
analysis is focused on after the 2002 elections. In this chapter, I aim to explain the change 
that occurred in the Turkish party system since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
took the power in Turkey.  
Party system and its characteristics in Turkey is a complicated topic due to its 
instability and frequently changing patterns. Since the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the founding fathers especially M.K Ataturk aimed to establish a multiparty 
democratic system in Turkey. However, due to lack of political and democratic traditions, 
attempt to transform Turkey to muliparty system failed. Finally Turkey transformed its party 
system in 1945 and first elections were held. The right wing Democrat Party won the absolute 
majority in the parliament in 1950.  It was first time a party other than left-oriented CHP 
(Republican People’s Party) which is also the founding party of the republic, assumed the 
power. Democrat Party enjoyed being the majority party for a decade until a military coup.  
The party system in Turkey had always been an unstable one. Most of the time no parties 
were able to gain majority of the seats. Therefore, parties were forced to form coalitions 
which were not performing well. Therefore, governments were failing to gain confidence 
vote and government were frequently changing. Additionally, frequent military interventions 
to political life significantly prevented the Turkish political system from completing its 
natural development. Many Turkish political scientists divide the formation of Turkish party 
system into two part. Pre 2002 and after 2002. (Tezcur 2012, Sayari 2007, Özbudun 2006, 
Köseoğlu 2011) 
The 2002 elections brought many firsts to the Turkish political sphere. For the first 
time, a party with Islamist roots became the governing party with 34.28 percent of the votes 
and almost two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. For the first time since 1991, a single-party 
government was formed. For the first time since the the transition to a multi-party system in 
1946, only two parties are represented in parliament, the AKP (Justice and Development 
Party) and the CHP (Republican People’s Party). Consequently, the fragmentation of seat 
index fell from 0.79 in 1999 to 0.46 in 2002. On the other hand, the volatility index rose 
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sharply from 19.9 in 1999 to an all-time high (54.45) in 2002.3  (Tezcur, 2012). The average 
level of fragmentation and volatility from 1983 to 2011 is 4.56 and 23.6 respectively. Of the 
six parties represented in the 1999 Parliament, five – DSP (Democratic Left Party), MHP 
(Nationalist Action Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), DYP (True Path Party) and SP 
(Felicity Party) – were not able to pass the ten percent national electoral threshold (Özbudun, 
2006, p. 1). The roots of results of 2002 elections can be traced back to the 1981 constitutions. 
Although the 2002 elections are considered the turning point in the party system. However, 
institutional arrangments that possibly led to the 2002 elections’ results were crafted after the 
1980 coup. The four main characteristics of the political system emerged after the coup. 
Since the results of elections contradict those characteristics the 2002 elections can be 
considered groundbreaking election.  
The Turkish Party system has four characteristics. The first characteristic is turnout. 
Turnout is calculated as the ratio of valid votes to registered voters. First, due to a policy of 
compulsory voting, there is a tendency that some voters are likely to cast invalid votes. 
Second, information about the number of all eligible voters was not available.  The average 
percentage of turnout from 1983 to 2011 is 83 % (Tezcur, 2012) 
The second characteristic of the Turkish party system is volatility. Volatility 
measures changes in voter preference for parties. The average volatility level is 23.6 percent 
between 1983 to 2007 according to Pedersen index. (Tezcur, 2012)The level volatility in 
Turkish elections is comparable to the new democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, but much higher than the established western democracies (Travits, 2005). The 
level of volatility notable increased since the 1970s (Eser Şekercioğlu, Gamze Arıkan, 2008, 
p. 218). Volatility reached a peak of 41.7 percent in 2002 when voters defected from 
established parties in reaction to the worst economic crisis that the country experienced since 
the end of the Second World War (Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanoğlu, Burhan Şenatalar, 
2005). High-level volatility indicates that party identities are weak in Turkey which means 
parties as political institutions failed to establish themselves as permanent entities. However, 
it must be noted that military interventions and party closures negatively affected political 
parties and prevented them from forming stable entities. Despite the general observation that 
volatility is a function of the longevity of a competitive regime. However, high levels of 
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volatility do not necessarily mean that social cleavages have lost their importance in Turkish 
electoral politics. In Turkey, volatility can be understood as an indicator of party system 
instability rather than as an indicator of voters merely reacting to the formation and 
disappearance of parties. (Tezcur, 2012).  It is important to note that the level of volatility 
significantly decreased since 2002 elections. In 2002 volatility level was 41.7. The next 
election in 2007 the level of volatility was 18.6 in 2011 11.6 (Tezcur, 2012). The decline in 
the volatility level indicates a new pattern in Turkish politics. The rise of the AKP brought 
electoral stability. The other centre-right parties as result of the AKP’s rise completely 
demised. CHP (Republican People Party) emerges as an only viable left-oriented party. 
Meanwhile, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) 
nowadays emerged as HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) consolidated their positions as 
representatives of the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, respectively. (Tezcur, 2012).  
The third characteristic is fragmentation. The fragmentation in Turkish parliament 
has always been high but it reached its peak in 1999 with 6.78 effective number of parties.  
By that time, seven parties (two centre-right, two centre-left, two nationalists, and one 
religious) competed for national influence. Since then, the trend has been reversed and 
dropped to 2.97 in 2011. Similar to the decline in volatility, this reversal indicates the 
stabilization of party system. In fact, Turkey now has a more consolidated party system than 
many established Western Europe democracies. (Reilly, 2007). However, it must be noted 
that stabilization in party system does not necessarily mean that the country already achieved 
sustainable democracy. Contrary, in the case of Turkey, the stabilization of party system 
allowed Erdogan to evade checks and balances and the change the governmental system from 
parliamentarism to presidentialism. If the stable party system continues in Turkey, it will 
increase the chance for Erdogan to establish his authoritarian rule. ““A considerable erosion 
of competitiveness has also accompanied the rise of the AKP in the Turkish party system. 
The distance between the winning and secondary party was rather low—a few percentage 
points—throughout the 1990s. In contrast, the AKP’s electoral victories were characterized 
by a wide margin”” (Tezcur, 2012, p. 120). Therefore, it is possible to say that in the new 
system AKP and president Erdogan will dominate the Turkish politics. 
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Finally, the last characteristic is disproportionality between the vote and seat share 
thanks to the 10 percent threshold. The threshold helped ANAP (Motherland Party) and AKP 
to win more seats than their vote shares would give them with a lower threshold. For example, 
ANAP received 36 percent of the valid votes and 65 percent of the seats in the 1987 elections. 
Similarly, AKP received 34 percent of the valid votes and 66 percent of the seats in 2002. 45 
percent of the valid votes were wasted due to the threshold. In the last two elections, as the 
MHP passed the ten percent threshold and the Kurdish nationalists successfully sponsored 
independent candidates, the AKP’s parliamentary majority was reduced even as the party 
increased its overall share of the vote. (Tezcur, 2012). 
3.2.1. Intra-Party Democracy 
Democracy cannot function without political parties. Political parties are the vital part 
of democratic systems because through political parties voters chose their policy preferences. 
Political parties are crucial to ensure the representativeness of democracy. In this regard, 
intra-party democracy is important because it is highly unlikely that a party without intra-
party democracy can govern in a democratically. (Tezcur, 2012) Intra-party democracy 
covers various aspects of party organization.  All areas of organizational structure should be 
designed according to democratic principles. Controllable, transparent, accountable structure 
would ensure party to function democratically. It includes a limitation to the duration of 
office, periodically holding elections to allow others to take part in the party administration 
etc. 
Lack of intra-party democracy has always been one of the main challenges of Turkish 
democracy. Many Turkish political scientists argue that the dominance of party leaders is the 
main reason why intra-party democracy is not achieved. (Mehmet Tan, Yeter Çiçek, Hatike 
Koçar, 2015; Gökçe, 2013; Erdem, Kabasakal, Gençkaya, 2000).   
There are factors that negatively affect intra-party democracy in Turkey; social structure, 
election system, pressure groups, party leadership and legislation. (Mehmet Tan, Yeter 
Çiçek, Hatike Koçar, 2015). I will not discuss all of these factors because not all of them fit 
the structure of my argumentation. However, I will discuss, the party leadership, intra-party 
regulation, and legislation since they directly related to my thesis. 
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3.2.2. The Party Leadership 
Political parties in Turkey due to its structure is highly centralized. Party central 
organizations dominate the local organizations. The office of party leader within the central 
organization has the absolute power. Therefore, it is rare to see a change of party leader in 
Turkish political life. Alparslan Turkes, Suleiman Demire, Bulent Ecevit seem to have ruled 
their parties for longer than a quarter of a century. (Özbudun, 2001, p. 247).  According to 
the law on political parties, the party leader is elected for three years (Art. 15). However, 
there is no term limit, therefore a party leader can be elected until his/her retirement. It is 
understandable that term limit in an intra-party democracy is not preferred because a 
successful party leader naturally would be the first choice of a party. Therefore, term limit 
cannot be considered the main hindrance for intra-party democracy. The main reason here is 
the structure of party central organization. Two factors in the central organization can be 
regarded as a negative impact. First is the way party leader is elected. Second, the high 
authority that is given to the party leader. Democratic governance problem in political parties 
in Turkey often stems from the broad authority granted to the leader. The fact that the 
provisions contained in party regulations authorize the party leaders to have last say in the 
solution of almost all problems. This, in turn, creates a political environment where the 
parties embody themselves in the personality of party leaders. In other words the 
personalization of power emerges. Party leaders in Turkey at any time can expell party 
founders or elected MPs from the party. They can dissolve provincial organizations, can 
confiscate or completely eliminate member registry book and can create completely new 
provincial congresses with the members they regroup and rewrite. In all the major parties' 
regulations, the authority to call extraordinary session is given to the party leader. Rarely, in 
some parties' regulations, this authority is given to General Administration Board. However, 
there are also provisions that allow party leader to influence the board. In party regulations, 
there are undemocratic provisions on disciplinary board. Party leaders have the authority to 
pardon the members who have been penalized by the disciplinary board. Furthermore, there 
is no supervisory board who can oversee party leaders' actions. (Ekizceleroğlu, 2008). Party 
leaders control the party members by rewarding or sanctioning them. In this control process, 
the most widely used method is extensive use of the disciplinary board. As mentioned above 
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party leaders have the almost absolute control on the disciplinary board. Party leader in this 
regard does not only use the disciplinary board. Party leader also uses his/her absolute 
authority on appointing intra-party positions as a rewarding mechanism. Party leader has 
right to select MP candidates. Therefore, the members who want to be appointed to positions 
in party organization or as an MP candidate is expected to have the same ideology with the 
party leader as well as not to openly oppose the party leader. The hierarchical structure of the 
party organization and strict rule ad great power to the party leaders. Party leaders would 
prefer to ensure the loyalty of members who the appointed to the party positions. Therefore, 
to be able appointed as an MP candidate or provincial, district and headquarters 
administrative levels is based on the principle of loyalty (Gökçe, 2013). Considering 
characteristics as mentioned earlier, the leadership style in political parties, the current 
situation of party leaders will possibly be transferred to the national level.  It is highly likely 
that presidential regime in Turkey will cause the same outcome. Even before the presidential 
system, the personalization of power in intra-party democracy already existed. Therefore, it 
is possible to claim that the president who is also the head of political party will have absolute 
power in the political system.  
In Turkey, Political parties are consist of central bodies, province and district 
organizations. (Political Parties Act, 1983b: art 7). Province and district organization 
communicate with the public through a neighbourhood and village representatives. Every 
position in all organizations of political parties can be assumed only through elections. 
However, it is under question that to what extent the elections are carried out according to 
democratic principles. The way the elections are carried out is left to the party regulations by 
the Political parties act. Despite small differences, all political parties have more or less the 
same elections method. Elections start from district organizations by applying delegation 
system. In the Republican People's Party (CHP) elections for district, delegates are held in 
the districts called "muhtarlik". (CHP, 2012: Art.48c). Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
uses the similar method but elections for district delegates are held in village and 
neighbourhood scales. (AK Party, 2001: Art.30). In both parties, elected delegates chose the 
head of district organization and the board. The method is applied to provincial organizations. 
In the political parties, the president and the top management of the party are elected by 
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delegates at meetings called Grand Congress or Kurultai. The provincial organizations 
determine the Kurultai delegates.. The delegation system superficially looks democratic, 
however, in practice it leads the domination of party top management, especially the party 
leader. Because the number of delegates is usually lower comparing the number of parties, 
therefore, it is easy to access the delegates and influence them and most of the time delegates 
are already elected to various offices within the parties. As I mentioned earlier due to the 
broad authority is given to the party leader, party officials depend on party leaders so do the 
delegates. Thus, delegation system undermines the intra-party democracy. 
To become a candidate for MP in CHP, there are three stages that one should go 
through. Pre-elections, candidate polling and central polling. The similar method exists in 
AKP however only the names of stages are different. Pre-elections, organizational polling 
and central polling. The pre-election is carried out with the participation of all registered 
members. The candidate polling in CHP is carried out by the delegates who are elected to 
certain positions in the party. In the final stage, central polling, the candidates are elected by 
the party top management and the party leader. The initiative in the central polling methods 
is entirely in the party leader and party top management. Likewise, the initiative in candidate 
polling or organizational polling is still in the top management or party leader. Therefore, it 
is highly likely that the party leader and the top management will dominate the elections of 
candidates. Candidates who are elected to the assembly, therefore depend on the party leader. 
In such circumstances, the president who is also the head of political party will be able to 
dominate the executive and the legislature. The party system and the lack of intra-party 
democracy in Turkey increase the possibility of the system to become a dictatorship. As it is 
discussed above, although the multiparty system is not desired for a presidential system, it 
hinders the executive to dominate the legislature. However, in Turkey, an effective number 
of parties is less than three which means that Turkey is not multiparty. The few numbers of 
parties in the legislature who are also the minority will have almost no influence on 
government. Therefore, it likely the executive can easily evade checks and balances. 
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4. Undemocratic Tendencies in Turkey 
The AKP and current Turkish president R.T. Erdogan are associated with 
authoritarianism by the media. In general, the rule of Erdogan is considered the start of the 
end of the Turkish Parliamentary democracy (Kaya, 2014, Öniş, 2015, Taspinar, 2014, 
Özbudun, 2014). Democracy in Turkey has always been a troubled one. However, the 
country managed to protect its fragile democratic institutions despite frequent military 
interventions, economic and political crisis. This chapter aims to show the decline in the 
Turkish democracy since 2002. To give a comprehensive view regarding undemocratic 
tendencies in Turkey since 2002. I used V.Dem Database to explain the current situation of 
democracy in Turkey and compare it to the 2002 situation. To do so I chose 5 V-Dem indices. 
Deliberative Democracy Index, Egalitarian Democracy Index, Electoral Democracy Index, 
Participatory Democracy Index, Liberal Democracy Index. V-Dem database is based on 
factual information obtained from official documents such as constitution and government 
records. Some of the indicators are based on subjective assessments 
Deliberative Democracy Index 
The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions 
are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on 
the common good motivates political decisions as contrasted with emotional appeals, 
solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy 
requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful 
dialogue at all levels from preference formation to the final decision among informed and 
competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the 
deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral 
democracy into account (V-Dem Varieties of Democracy, n.d.).  
Egalitarian Democracy Index 
The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power 
across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This 
perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil 
49 
 
liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have 
approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under 
the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does 
not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and 
health so as to enhance political equality. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the 
index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account (V-Dem Varieties of 
Democracy, n.d.). 
Electoral Democracy Index 
  The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers 
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval 
under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can 
operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and 
elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, 
there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative 
views on matters of political relevance (V-Dem Varieties of Democracy, n.d.) 
Liberal Democracy Index 
  The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting 
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. 
The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality 
of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally 
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks 
and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of 
liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account (V-Dem 




  Chart 1 
Source: (V-Dem Varieties of Democracy, n.d.) 
 
 
Each index scored on the scale of 0 to 1. In 2002 the score of Egalitarian Democracy 
Index was 0.416. The peak was reached in 2004 when the score was 0.469. However, since 
then egalitarian democracy index started to decline. By 2016 the score was 0.341. The same 
pattern is seen in other indexes as well, for example, the score of electoral democracy index 
in 2002 was 0.662. The peak was reached in 2004. The score was 0.704 and since then decline 
is observed. The score for electoral democracy index in 2015 reached the lowest point 0.407. 
In 2002 score of liberal democracy index was 0.498. Again in 2004, the score reached its 
peak by 0.538. The latest score of liberal democracy index is in 2015 which is also the lowest 
with 0.229. Deliberative democracy index also follows the same pattern. The score of 
deliberative democracy index in 2002 was 0.561. The highest point was reached in 2004 with 
the score 0.596. The latest data about the deliberative democracy index is in 2016 which is 
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again also the lowest with 0.112. Compared to other indexes decline in the deliberative 
democracy index is higher than others. It can be explained by the domination of AKP in the 
legislature since 2002. As the deliberative democracy index requires including competent 
participants to the decision-making process, AKP’s unaccompanied rule can be the 
explanation of significant decline. Participatory democracy index as well fits the same 
pattern. In 2002, the score was 0.339. In 2004 the score slightly increased and reached its 
peak by 0.364. The latest data about participatory democracy index is in 2015 and the score 
is 0.207 
The data taken from V-Dem explicitly shows the decline of democracy in Turkey since 
the rule of AKP. Although there is an increase in all indexes in 2004, it is only temporary 
because after 2004 there is a consistent decline in all indexes. In conclusion, the rule of AKP 
and R.T. Erdogan since 2002 can be regarded the start of the decline of Turkish democracy. 
The fact strengthens the argument of the thesis that the new presidential system is the 





5. Measurement of the Presidential Power 
Amendments to the Turkish constitution proposed by the incumbent party AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) was accepted by 51.2 percent of votes in the referendum 
held on 16th April 2017. The Amendment proposal aimed to shift Turkish political system 
from parliamentary to presidential. Many criticisms towards the amendment proposal made 
by the Turkish political opposition during the pre-referendum campaign did not change the 
result. Of course, there are worth mentioning reasons to doubt that the pre-referendum 
campaign took place under the equal conditions. Even the main opposition party CHP 
(Republican People's Party) claimed that the results were falsified. However, the result will 
not be changed and the new constitution will be enforced in 2018 after the presidential and 
parliamentary elections on 24th June. This chapter will be dedicated to a comparative analysis 
of presidential power according to the new and previous constitution. The questions such as 
"What authorities the new constitution gives to the president?", "What will be the position of 
legislature and judiciary after the enforcement of the new constitution?", "Why and how 
Turkey may turn into a dictatorship?" will be clarified as a result of this chapter.  
Presidential power is divided into two parts. Legislative and Non-legislative. To 
measure the authority which the new Constitution endows to the presidency, I use (Matthew 
Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992) method measuring presidential power. I also compare 
presidential power according to the new and previous constitution, to create a clear 
understanding of regime change. Shugart and Carey also classify presidential systems 
according to the legislative and non-legislative authority of the presidency, which allows 
them to infer which regime types are vulnerable to democratic breakdown. Additionally, 
there are some aspects of the new constitution which are not directly related to the 
presidential power, therefore, cannot be measured according to Shugart and Carey's method. 
Such as methods of electing a president or electoral cycle and appointment of judges by the 
president. These aspects of the new regime will be separately examined to draw a completed 
picture. Schugart and Carey’s method covers all the important aspect of presidential authority 
in two dimensions. The indicators that are used by Schugart and Carey provides a 
comprehensive explanation on presidential authority. (Doyle, Elgie, 2014 p.731) identified 
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forty-five methods for measuring presidential power ““In all but four of these studies, 
presidential power was operationalized explicitly or implicitly as an explanatory variable. In 
these forty-five studies, the dependent variable ranged widely across topics such as economic 
reform, democratic consolidation, the level of protectionism, the effective number of parties, 
cabinet composition, voter turnout and many others””. Additionally, the indicators that are 
chosen are detailed enough to understand the increase in presidential power. The criticism 
can be directed to Schugart and Carey’s method is that constitution can be imperfect 
measures for actual presidential power. The power that may occur from personal behaviour 
is not taken into consideration by Schugart and Carey. However, analysis of intra-party 
democracy, especially domination of party leaders in political parties can compensate the 
gap due to two reasons. First, presidentialism by nature creates the personalization of power 
(Linz, 1990). Second, domination of part leaders that exist in Turkish party system 
exacerbates the previous. 
Another criticism of the method is made by (Fortin, 2013). She founded out that seven 
of the ten indicators cluster into a single factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 and with no 
evidence of separate latent constructs for legislative and non-legislative powers. She also 
pointed out that the process of aggregating the scores for the individual indicators is 
problematic. She states: ““[a]ggregation produces homogeneity claims, meaning that equal 
scores are substitutable or equivalent’ However, she noted that each score can be obtained 
through broad combinations of different powers, and should thus not be considered 
homogenous in terms of causal analyses”” (Doyle, Elgie, 2014 p.734) ““She goes on to argue 
that for any given measure, ‘not all items hypothesized to capture the concept of presidential 
power seem to matter equally in accounting for composite scores and that ‘not all potentially 
relevant items were tested”” (Doyle, Elgie, 2014 p.734). The criticism may be valid regarding 
the methodological point of view. However, the indicators that are proposed by Schugart and 
Carey captures the scope of this thesis.  Especially, considering the analysis of the other 







Package Veto/Override  
4 Veto with no override  
3 Veto with override requiring majority greater 
than 2/3 (of quorum)  
2 Veto with override requiring 2/3  
1 Veto with override requiring absolute 
majority of assembly or extraordinary majority 
less than 2/3  
0 No veto: or veto requires only simple majority 
override  
Decree  
4 Reserved powers, no rescission  
2 President has temporary decree authority with 
few restrictions  
1 Authority to enact decrees limited  
0 No decree powers; or only as delegated by 
assembly  
Budgetary Powers  
4 President prepares budget: no amendment 
permitted  
3 Assembly may reduce but not increase 
amount of budgetary items  
2 President sets upper limit on total spending  
1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if 
it designates new revenues  
0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare 
or amend budget  
Partial Veto/Override  
4 No override  
3 Override by extraordinary majority  
2 Override by absolute majority of whole 
membership  
1 Override by simple majority of quorum  
0 No partial veto  
Exclusive Introduction of Legislation 
(Reserved Policy Areas)  
4 No amendment by assembly  
2 Restricted amendment by assembly  
1 Unrestricted amendment by assembly  
0 No exclusive Powers  
Proposal of Referenda  
4 Unrestricted  
2 Restricted  
0 No presidential authority to propose 
referenda  





Cabinet Formation  
4 President names cabinet without need for 
confirmation or investiture  
3 President names cabinet minister subject to 
confirmation or investiture by assembly  
1 President names premier, subject to 
investiture, who then names other ministers  
0 President cannot name ministers except upon 
recommendation of assembly  
Censure  
4 Assembly may not censure and remove 
cabinet or ministers  
2 Assembly may censure, but president may 
respond by dissolving assembly  
1 “Constructive” vote of no confidence 
(assembly majority must present alternative 
cabinet)  
0 Unrestricted censure  
Cabinet Dismissal  
4 President dismisses cabinet ministers at will  
2 Restricted powers of dismissal  
1 President may dismiss only upon acceptance  
0 Cabinet or minister may be censured and 
removed by assembly  
Dissolution of Assembly  
4 Unrestricted  
3 Restricted by frequency or point within term  
2 Requires new presidential election  
1 Restricted: only as response to censures  
0 No provision  
Table 1.2: Non-Legislative Power 
Source: (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992)  
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5.1. Legislative Power 
Some presidential systems empower the presidency with the legislative power which 
consists of package veto, partial veto, decree, the exclusive introduction of legislation, 
budgetary initiative and, the proposal of referenda. Common agreement on legislative power 
is that legislative power is ““the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter 
or repeal them.”” (Bouvier, 1856) by the assemblies. However, in some cases usually, in 
presidential systems this authority to some extent can be shared with the executive. In their 
article, Shugart and Carey state that ““regimes with great presidential legislative powers are 
problematic”” (Shugart & Carey 1992) in a sense that democratic breakdowns may occur. 
5.1.2. Package and Partial Veto 
The veto power allows the executive to effectively interfere with the legislative 
process. By using veto power, the executive can force the legislature to compromise and 
amend laws or law drafts which are in contradiction with the executive point of view. 
However, overuse of the veto can result in antagonization between the branches. According 
to the constitutional amendment, the president is empowered with the veto power. The 
president can send back the law draft for further consideration. The Parliament can accept 
the draft without modification only with the absolute majority of the members (Article 16). 
However, according to the previous constitution, the president can veto a law draft no more 
than two times. If a law draft is sent back to the president for the third time, the president is 
obligated to sign. (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992) classify four types of veto power 
in terms of override mechanisms. If a veto cannot be overridden, the president is powerful 
and influential over the legislature. Therefore, Shugart and Carey score the veto power with 
the highest number 4. 3 to one where ““the majority required is more difficult for Congress 
to obtain than a two-thirds majority, but the veto is nonetheless not absolute”” (Shugart & 
Carey, 1992). 2 to one requiring a two-thirds to override. 1 to one which the veto override 
requires more than the simple majority but less than two-thirds. 0 to one which can be 
overridden by the same majority which passes the law draft. According to the amendment to 
override the presidential veto absolute majority of deputies is required otherwise a law draft 
does not pass. Therefore, the package veto score is a 2. For the partial veto power, Shugart 
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and Corey distinguish two-thirds majority from the absolute majority and score them 
accordingly 3 and 2. Other scoring mechanisms are the same. Therefore, for the partial veto 
power according to the new constitution, the score is a 2. According to the previous 
constitution since the legislature is required to override a law draft twice to pass; therefore, 
the package and partial veto score is a 1. Veto power is crucial in terms of policy stability. 
(Tsebelis, 1995, p. 293) argues that ““policy stability causes government or regime 
instability””. Thus, it can be interpreted that fewer veto players are important to ensure 
regime stability. By veto players, (Tsebelis, 1995) considers an individual or collective actor 
whose agreement is required for a policy decision. Increase of stability in system occurs 1) 
the number of veto players, 2) differences in their political stance and 3) the internal cohesion 
of each one of them. The president by having a strong presidential power will be able to 
block policy proposals coming from the legislature which would result in policy stability. 
Considering Tsebellis’ argument strong presidential veto power may cause regime instability 
and democratic breakdown in Turkey. 
5.1.3. Decree 
A decree is an authority of the executive to establish the law. According to 
amendment proposal, article 104. ““The president can issue decrees regarding its executive 
power. The basic rights, personal rights and duties, and political rights and duties that are in 
the constitution cannot be regulated by presidential decree. If there are conflicting provisions 
in presidential decrees and laws; laws prevail. If the Grand National Assembly issues a law 
on the same topic, the presidential decree becomes obsolete””. (Article 104) The presidential 
decree can be restricted. According to Shugart and Carey, the decree power with some 
restriction is 2. However, it needs to be mentioned that presidential decree is in the special 
position in the new constitution. It will be equal to law. The given authority results with 
sharing legislative function of the state with the president. Besides, the president can issue 
decrees in a name of parliament regarding the executive matters. In this way, the legislative 
authority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly will be shared with the presidency. 
Therefore, the score for the decree power is 3. In the current system, however, president's 
authority regarding decree power is symbolic. The president signs decrees adopted by a 
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cabinet of ministers. Thus, the score for the decree power according to the previous 
constitution is 0. 
5.1.4. Executive Introduction of Legislation 
One of the most common presidential power is the authority to introduce legislation 
in assembly. However, there are some presidencies which do not have such authority. 
Nevertheless, any president can find a member of the assembly, in Turkish case, from his/her 
own party to introduce a law draft that the president desires. Especially, in case of Turkey, 
considering that, the president will also be the leader of his/her party, the president surely 
will be able to instruct legislation. According to the amendment, the president is not allowed 
to propose law drafts. (Kucuk. 2017) in his article compares agenda power of the Turkish 
presidency with the US one and argues that both presidencies have the same authority. 
According to the amendment of the Constitution, the President of Turkey does not have the 
authority to propose a law draft. But the President, as the US president, can give the opening 
speech in Parliament on the first day of the legislative year. With these speeches and 
messages, he can suggest passing or remove laws that he desires. However, unlike US 
President, Turkish president does not need a ratification from parliament for international 
treaties that he/she signs or representatives of the state in foreign countries that he/she 
chooses. ““The president sends representatives of the Republic of Turkey to foreign states 
and accepts representatives of foreign states to be sent to the Republic of Turkey. Approves 
and publishes international treaties.”” (Article 104). Moreover, (Matthew Shugart, John M. 
Carey, 1992) distinguishes agenda power from decrees as follows ““Agenda power entails 
presidential control over the policy alternatives among which legislatures debate and select, 
whereas decree allows presidents to implement policies without legislative debate or 
assent.”” 
Consequently, according to the amendment, the president does not have an authority 
to introduce a law draft. Thus, the score is supposed to be 0.  
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5.1.5. Budgetary Initiative 
The new constitution allows the president to initiate annual budget. The legislature 
cannot increase, decrease, allocate money to a new item or create a new item. The only 
authority is given to legislature either approve or reject the annual budget. In case legislature 
rejects the budget law, the legislature is obligated to issue temporary budget law. If the 
legislature does not issue temporary budget law, the president can use and adjust the budget 
law of previous year. (Article 161) According to Shugart and Carey' assessment, if no 
amendments are permitted to the legislature on a budget law proposed by the president, the 
score for the budgetary initiative shall be 4. The previous constitution does not allow the 
president to initiate budget law hence, the score for budget initiative according to the previous 
constitution is 0. 
5.1.6. Proposal of Referenda 
In some systems, the president is granted the authority to propose referenda. Shugart 
and Carey score this power a 4 if the power is unrestricted. According to the amendment 
proposal, the president can propose referenda for constitutional change (Article 104). In the 
amendment, no restriction for proposing referenda by the president is mentioned. Therefore, 
the score for it is a 4. In the previous constitution, the proposal of referenda must be approved 
330 deputies out of 550. Therefore, the score according to the previous constitution is 2. 
5.2. Non-legislative Power 
The authority to form or dismiss cabinet and dissolve assembly are Non-legislative 
powers of the president in which the president exercises the executive power.  
5.2.2. Cabinet Formation and Dismissal 
Usually, the president who is elected by popular vote to exercise the executive power 
is free to form a cabinet. However, there are some cases cabinet formation is subject to 
legislative approval. (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992) consider the involvement of 
legislature in cabinet formation as a negative case as it threatens the separation of power. In 
the amendment proposal, article 104 endows the president to appoint upper-level public 
officials, ministers and the procedures and principles regarding their appointment is regulated 
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by the President's decree. Thus, the President will not be bound by law in the formation of 
the administrative organisation, but will also set the rules for appointment and dismissal. 
Setting rules for appointment are not only a non-legislative power, it also implies legislative 
power because regulation regarding state-related activity is supposed to be an authority of 
the legislature. The amendment completely uproots legislature from state-related activities 
and weakens its position in the system. Shugart and Carey score the authority of cabinet 
formation without legislative approval a 4. However, their assessment does not include the 
authority for setting rules for appointment and dismissal. Therefore, I score cabinet formation 
power of the president a 5. Same principals also apply for cabinet dismissal. Hence, cabinet 
dismissal power of the president is a 5. 
5.2.3. Censure 
The power of censure is not necessarily the presidential power. It belongs to the 
legislature in which the assembly may remove ministers. Therefore, when there is no censure, 
meaning that only the president can remove ministers. According to the amendment proposal, 
the legislature cannot only remove but also cannot an even direct question to the president 
and cannot control the president's action. The legislature is only allowed to direct question 
to the vice-presidents and ministers. However, the legislature can open an inquiry if the 
absolute majority of deputies is gained. But the final decision is made by the president. 
(Article 16). Considering aforementioned conditions give only a small censure power to the 
legislature, the score for the censure power is a 4. 
5.2.4. Dissolution of Assembly 
Some systems give power to the president to dissolve the assembly. However, this 
authority is restricted in various ways. For example, according to the previous constitution, 
the president can renew the elections for parliament if Parliament does not form a government 
within 45 days. The important aspect is that the parliament will be in power until the new 
parliament members are elected. The new amendment gives authority to the president to 
renew the elections. Parliament may also renew elections if the fifth three majority agrees. 
““The elections can be called either with a three-fifths majority of the Grand National 
Assembly or by the President.”” (Article 116). Another important aspect is that If the 
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Assembly decides to renew the elections in the second term of the President, the President 
may once again be a candidate. (Article 116). Thus, the new constitution indirectly allows 
one person to be elected for the third term. A president whose party is also the majority in 
parliament can instruct his/her party to renew the elections so he/she can be a candidate for 
the third period. As the president can dissolve assembly by the elections without any 
restriction, the score for this power is a 4. According to the previous constitution, the score 




Table 2: The Score of the Presidential Power  


























1 1 0 0 0 2 4 1 0 0 3 4 
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5.2.5. Typology of Turkish Presidentialism 
Shugart and Carey classify typology of presidential systems based on two dimensions 
legislative and non-legislative power. They divide the figure into six regions where they 
locate presidential regimes according to presidents’ legislative and non-legislative power. In 
the first region presidents with high legislative and non-legislative power are located. The 
regimes in the second region grant presidents with great legislative powers but their non-
legislative power is comparatively weaker. The third region is empty because it is not 
practical to grand presidents with high legislative power but weaker non-legislative power 
even than the second region. The fourth region consists of presidential systems with the 
weakest president in both dimensions. Region fifth consists of moderately powerful 
presidents. Finally, Region sixth includes presidents with weak legislative power but great 
powers over government formation.  
Figure 1 Regime Types 
 
Source: (Matthew Shugart, John M. Carey, 1992) 
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According to Shugart and Carey’s classification Turkey is located in the first region 
since the president has great legislative and non-legislative power. In the first region, there 
are regimes which are undemocratic. The authors exclude those regimes as an elimination 
criterion in terms of assessing democratic breakdowns. However, it must be noted that the 
fact that the first region includes nondemocratic regimes, there might be an affinity between 
strong presidencies and authoritarianism. Nevertheless, Turkey which is not yet completely 
dictatorship can be included as an elimination criterion. Although Shugart and Carey mention 
that their sample is too small to make a claim of statistical significance, six of 10 democratic 
breakdowns occurred in the first region.  Brazil 1988? Bulgaria, Colombia 1991, Haiti Korea 
1987, Namibia, Panama, and Argentina. The fact that Turkey also fits the first region, it gives 
us a reason to be concerned about the sustainability of democracy in Turkey. As a 
comparison, I would like to mention that none of the presidential regimes that are measured 
by Shugart and Carey is scored as higher as Turkish presidential power. For example the 
highest legislative power is given to Chile 1969 is 12, however, the Turkish president’s score 
is 15. Moreover, the highest non-legislative power given to Paraguay is 16. Turkish 
president’s non-legislative power is 18. According to the table 2 which is constructed based 
on Shugart and Carey’s method shows that the new Constitution  grants the presidency with 
the extraordinary authority. The presidency is brought to the higher level than the usual. The 
president utilising the granted powers can become dominant on the judiciary and the 
legislature. The sustainability and the survival of democracy are highly dependent on the 
separation of power. Depending on a regime type the separation of power can be allocated 
or intertwined respectively to the parliamentary and presidential systems. Otherwise, the 
possibility of the system to turn from democracy to autocracy is regarded as high. The new 
Constitution flagrantly violates one of the essential principles of democracy. The US system 
was taken as an example for the new Turkish Constitution. However, the analysis of the new 
constitution and the table explicitly shows that the new constitution violates the key features 
of the US system. The US Constitution does not grant the presidency with high legislative 
power as the new Turkish constitution does. According to the Shugart and Carey’s table, The 
US president’s overall legislative power is a 2. The US president is empowered only with the 
package veto power. Contrary to the US presidency, the Turkish presidency’s legislative 
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power is a 15. The huge difference between the Turkish and the US system allows claiming 
that the new Turkish system does not have the necessary features which ensure the 





The goal of this thesis was to understand the relationship between the presidential 
system and dictatorship in the case of Turkey. For this purpose, an extensive literature review 
was conducted to understand the presidential system and its perils. Perils of presidetialism 
are chosen explicitly regarding their relativeness to the case. Presidentialism and its 
compatibility with democracy is not a new topic. However, the case of Turkey in this respect 
is a new and interesting topic. It is the first time long-established parliamentary democracy 
despite its fragile institutions changed its system from parliamentarism to presidentialism. 
The fact in itself raises the question about the future of the country. Will Turkey manage to 
remain a democracy or the country will fall into a dictatorship? Because there are 
considerable factors that increase the possibility. First, problems emerge from the intrinsic 
institutional design of presidentialism. Second, the specific features of Turkish 
presidentialism and finally already existing authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. 
Review of literature on presidentialism and its perils revealed vital factors which can 
cause trouble for democracy in Turkey. Dual legitimacy is one of them. Since presidents and 
assemblies are elected independently from one another, it causes problems for the system to 
function. In case of disagreement between assembly and president, neither side has an 
institutional tool to solve the problem without causing governmental deadlock. In this 
respect, we can see that dual legitimacy causes rigid separation in the system. In terms of 
limiting presidential dominance in the system, dual legitimacy and the rigid separation can 
be proven useful, however, it comes at a price. Governmental deadlock may cause dissolution 
of the assembly which in turn can increase the role of the president is the system. Considering 
that the constitutional amendment grants the president authority to dissolve the parliament. 
This scenario is highly likely.  
Due to the structure of office of the presidency, the system creates a zero-sum game. 
Since the only one person can be elected president, the other candidates do not gain anything 
even if they gain a considerable share of the vote. Additionally, due to a zero-sum game, the 
significant portion of the voters are not represented in the executive. It is possible that the 
cabinet is shared with different political parties, however, coalitions in presidentialism are 
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less sustainable than in parliamentarism. Therefore, it creates another peril of 
presidentialism, the personalization of power which has always been the case in Turkish 
political system. The current president Erdogan has already emerged as a strong man. 
Furthermore, political leaders have always been on the fore of political agenda. The analysis 
of Turkish party system supports the fact that the personalization of power highly likely will 
happen in Turkey. It is one of the reasons which causes concern regarding the future of the 
country.  
The core of this paper is the analysis of the constitutional amendment. The purpose 
of the analysis was to understand the outlines and the key characteristic of the Turkish 
presidentialism to understand how the system may breed dictatorship. The first part of the 
analysis is dedicated to the role of assembly. The analysis reveals that the legislature will not 
have any political control over the executive. The amendment exceeds the US-style pure 
presidentialism because presidentialism is constructed on the principle of separation of 
power. The analysis of the amendment shows that the Turkish presidentialism violates one 
of the main principles of presidential systems. Moreover, the Congress has the monopoly of 
authorizing the President to spend on the President through the budgetary act and has 
effective oversight over the Executive Body. However, the Turkish parliament is deprived of 
initiating budgetary act. The full initiation belongs to the president in the new system.  
The amendment also changes the role of the president in the system. It is 
understandable that in presidential systems, presidents have broader authority than in 
parliamentary systems. Therefore, increasing the power of the president at first glance can 
look inevitable result of the amendment. However, the examination of the amendment shows 
that the power is given to the president by the constitution is much broader and to some extent 
dangerous. The new system grants the president extremely high decree power which enables 
the president to rule without the need for parliamentary consent. This will enable the 
president to dominate the political agenda. The president will be almost entirely independent 
of checks and balances. The decree power alone is not the only reason why the president can 
avoid checks and balances. President is also given unlimited appointment power. The 
president can form a cabinet, can appoint and dismiss cabinet members. The legislature is 
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not given any constitutional tools to oversee presidential appointments. In the new system, 
the president can also be the party member. This is another reason which raises concern. 
There is a risk that party establishment through the presidential office will take over the 
whole branches of government. The president by having the majority in the legislature can 
easily take control of the system. The amendment has a gap in terms of the term limit. Article 
101 sets out that one person can only be elected twice as the president. However, article 116 
gives the president possibility to be elected for the third time. According to article 116, in 
case the assembly decides to dissolve itself the new presidential and parliamentary elections 
will be held. In that case, the constitution allows the president who is already serving the 
second term to be a candidate for the third time. Therefore, a president with the parliamentary 
majority can avoid the term limit. The term limit is part of checks and balances. It is set to 
prohibit the presidents to take control of the system and establish an authoritarian regime. 
The gap in the constitution is another reason for the possible democratic breakdown. 
The new system also undermines the independence of judiciary via presidential 
appointment. The president can appoint 5 of the 13 members of "Supreme Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors” Considering that the Minister of Justice and Undersecretary of Ministry of 
Justice who are also members of the board are also appointed by the president the number 
becomes 7. The legislature appoints remaining five members. In case, the president has a 
majority in the legislature, and the president will be able to appoint all members of the board. 
Thus, it is hard to believe that the new system will be able to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary. Furthermore, the president can also directly and indirectly via different institutions 
appoint the members of Constitutional Court. 
The analysis of the constitutional amendment explicitly shows how the legislature 
and the judiciary is weakened against the executive. The balance of power in the system is 
violated in favour of the executive and the role of the president within the executive is sharply 
increased. Therefore, it is hard to believe that the separation of power in the new system will 
be guaranteed. However, by only analysing the constitutional amendment it is not possible 
to claim that the country will fall into dictatorship. For a better understanding of the system, 
I examined the party system in Turkey. The purpose of the analysis was to draw a clear 
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picture of Turkish political system and explain the background in which the new presidential 
system will be applied. The argument in theoretical part was that presidentialism could not 
function efficiently in multipartyism. However, multipartyism is important to prevent the 
president to dominate the legislature. Because if there is a multipartyism in the country, 
presidents must seek cooperation with the parties in the legislature to pass the laws. The 
cooperation in case of Turkey can be regarded another form of checks and balances. Because 
if the president cannot gain the support of the opposition, it is impossible to execute the 
presidential power. Therefore, the president would avoid proposing a controversial law 
which can undermine the democratic institutions. The analysis of Turkish party system shows 
that there is 2.6 effective number of parties in the legislature. Therefore, multipartyism does 
not exist in Turkey. Additionally, currently, the president of Turkey has a majority in the 
parliament. In case the president manages to keep the majority, the legislature will be under 
total control of the president. To prove this, I also examined intra-party democracy and 
domination of party leaders. The analysis shows that Turkish political parties even during 
the parliamentary system lacked intra-party democracy. 
The final part of the paper was dedicated to measuring presidential power. To do so, 
I used the method proposed by Schugart and Carey. The presidential power was divided into 
two dimensions; legislative and non-legislative. The measurement was done by the simple 
scoring method. According to the authority given to the president, power scored between 0 
to 4. In some cases, I scored the presidential power with a 5. Because the power is given to 
the Turkish presidency exceeded the range set by Schugart and Carey. As a result, the overall 
Legislative power of Turkish president was 17. Non-legislative power is 18. The results are 
the highest among all other presidential powers measured by Schugart and Carey which is 
another reason to be concerned about future of the Turkish democracy. Turkish 
Presidentialism is also classified according to Schugart and Carey’s classification. Turkey is 
located in the first region. The first region includes presidential systems with high legislative 
and non-legislative power. Six of the ten democratic breakdowns occurred in this region. 
Although authors exclude authoritarian regimes, the region can also include those regimes 
due to their high legislative and non-legislative power.  
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In conclusion, considering aforementioned findings, it is possible to infer that 
democracy is at high risk in Turkey. Presidentialism in Turkey seems likely does not provide 
any institutional means to prevent democratic breakdown contrary the system is defenceless 
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